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THE LOCAL-CONTROL MODEL OF THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT 
MICHAEL J. ZYDNEY MANNHEIMER* 
 Fourth Amendment doctrine has been home to two competing models: 
the Warrant Model and the Reasonableness Model.  The Warrant Model, 
emphasizing the Amendment’s Warrant Clause, holds that search and arrest 
via warrant is the preferred method and the default rule, though allowing for 
exceptions when obtaining a warrant is impracticable.  The Reasonableness 
Model, which stresses the Amendment’s Reasonableness Clause, holds that 
the Amendment imposes a generalized reasonableness standard on searches 
and seizures by which the question is not whether dispensing with a warrant 
is reasonable but whether the search or seizure itself is reasonable.  These 
polar positions have been replicated in the scholarly literature on the history 
surrounding the adoption of the Fourth Amendment.  Some adhere to a 
reading of the historical record that roughly supports the Warrant Model 
while others have found that history more strongly supports the 
Reasonableness Model. 
This Article interprets the historical record differently than either of the 
two dominant schools, and introduces a third model of the Fourth 
Amendment: the Local-Control Model.  It situates the Fourth Amendment as 
the culmination of a decades-long, continent-wide struggle by Americans for 
local control over search-and-seizure policy as against central authority.  
And it posits the Fourth Amendment as the result of an effort on the part of 
the Anti-Federalists, those who demanded a Bill of Rights, to maintain local 
control over search-and-seizure policy.  On this view, the Fourth Amendment 
has a strong federalism component.  It demands neither that federal officers 
generally use warrants for searching and seizing nor that they act pursuant 
to a general reasonableness standard.  Rather, the Local-Control Model 
supports the view that federal officers must generally follow state law in 
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Witmer-Rich, Matt Tokson, and Ekow Yankah, and participants of CrimFest 2015!, held at 
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this 
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conducting searches and seizures. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
When it comes to the Fourth Amendment,1 history matters, perhaps now 
more than ever.  The Fourth Amendment decisions of the U.S. Supreme 
Court in recent years have addressed such modern phenomena as electronic 
hotel registries, collection of DNA from arrestees, and GPS tracking of 
suspects.  Nevertheless, the Court’s opinions in these cases have witnessed 
such real and imagined framing-era characters as “‘tithingmen . . . search[ing] 
 
1  The Fourth Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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public houses of entertainment on [the] Sabbath,’”2 early Americans 
“open[ing] their mouths for royal inspection,”3 and, of course, the “very tiny 
constable.”4 
If history matters, then we ought to get that history right.  There is a 
plethora of available information regarding our eighteenth-century 
predecessors’ law, policy, and custom on search and seizure.  Nevertheless, 
there is widespread disagreement over how to interpret those data.  Some see 
the history surrounding the adoption of the Fourth Amendment as pointing 
to a general requirement that the government be reasonable when it searches 
and seizes.  On this view, reasonableness is determined largely by after-the-
fact jury determinations, not a before-the-fact warrant requirement.  Others 
see that history as more strongly supporting a warrant requirement as a 
mechanism for judges to control the discretion of executive officers. 
Neither side is entirely correct.  Both types of regulation of government 
officials’ conduct—a general reasonableness requirement backed by the 
threat of lawsuit and a requirement that executive discretion be tightly 
controlled by judicial supervision—appear in colonial America and the early 
Republic.  Yet to say that a system is characterized by a particular type of 
regulation is far different from saying that such a regulation is either a 
necessary or a sufficient component of that system.  Neither dominant model 
of Fourth Amendment history has captured the touchstone of the 
Amendment.  That touchstone is neither warrants nor reasonableness, but 
local control. 
This Article contends that the best way to understand the Fourth 
Amendment, as a historical matter, is as a reservation of local control over 
federal searches and seizures.5  While there was a general consensus by 1791 
that general warrants were unlawful, search-and-seizure rules were, in other 
respects, to be controlled by state law.  Three episodes during the roughly 
 
2  City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2459–60 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(quoting WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING 
743 (2009) (alteration added)). 
3  Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1989 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
4  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 958 n.3 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
5   The word “federal” in this sentence is critical.  From 1791 to 1868, the Fourth 
Amendment regulated only federal searches and seizures.  It is only with the adoption in 1868 
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No 
State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”), 
that we can speak of the Fourth Amendment as controlling searches by state officials as well.  
Given the focus of this Article on the history surrounding the adoption of the Fourth 
Amendment in 1791, it does not attempt to thoroughly address the critical but separate issue 
of how the Fourth Amendment should be thought to apply to the States.  However, the Article 
does offer a few brief, preliminary thoughts in that direction.  See infra Section III.C. 
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thirty-year period surrounding the adoption of the Fourth Amendment⎯the 
writs-of-assistance controversy of the 1760s, the States’ conditional 
ratifications of a national impost under the Articles of Confederation in the 
1780s, and the enactment of two early federal statutes in the 1790s—each 
evoke the theme of local control over central authority vis-à-vis searches and 
seizures.  This theme of local control dovetails almost perfectly with the 
motivation of the Anti-Federalists in demanding a Bill of Rights in exchange 
for their reluctant acquiescence to the Constitution: the reservation of state 
power regarding the most important spheres of human activity. 
Recent scholarship has begun to question the sharp dichotomy in 
constitutional law between rights and structure, and to rediscover the linkages 
between them.6  In isolating a powerful theme of federalism in the Fourth 
Amendment, this Article is of a piece with that recent scholarship.  Neither 
dominant historical model of the Fourth Amendment adequately accounts for 
this strong federalism component of the Bill of Rights.  Only the Local-
Control Model can do so. 
Part I examines, and offers a brief critique of, the two dominant models 
of interpreting the history surrounding the Fourth Amendment: the 
Reasonableness Model and the Warrant Model.  Part II discusses at length 
three episodes that shed light on the original understanding of the Fourth 
Amendment.  The first, the writs-of-assistance controversy of the 1760s, has 
been the subject of much commentary.  However, few have appreciated this 
episode for what it was: not a unified colonial revolt against general warrants, 
but a set of particularized assertions of local control, differing by colony, 
against Crown authority.  The second, the States’ placement of conditions on 
their ratification of a national impost under the Articles of Confederation, has 
almost entirely escaped the notice of Fourth Amendment scholars.  This 
episode also involved particularized conditions, varying by State, placed on 
central search-and-seizure authority.  Finally, the enactment of section 33 of 
the Judiciary Act of 1789 and section nine of the Militia Act of 1792, which 
explicitly calibrated federal search-and-seizure authority to that of the 
respective States, suggests an understanding of the Fourth Amendment 
heavily infused with federalism principles.  Part III posits local control of 
searches and seizures as the touchstone for each of these three episodes in the 
early American experience.  It attempts to demonstrate the superiority of the 
Local-Control Model as a historical matter by tying these three episodes to 
the federalism-based motivations of the Anti-Federalists in demanding 
constraints on federal search-and-seizure authority. 
 
6  See generally Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as 
Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672 (2012); Heather K. Gerken, Windsor’s Mad 
Genius: The Interlocking Gears of Rights and Structure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 587, 587–88 (2015). 
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I.  THE TWO DOMINANT MODELS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The central puzzle of the Fourth Amendment has always been what the 
relationship is between its two clauses.  The first, the Reasonableness Clause, 
demands that all governmental searches and seizures of “persons, houses, 
papers, and effects” be reasonable.7  The second, the Warrant Clause, spells 
out three requirements before a warrant may be issued: probable cause, oath 
or affirmation, and particularity.8  But what is the relationship between these 
two Clauses?  Some have asserted that the Amendment means that a warrant 
must be used to render a search or seizure reasonable, at least presumptively.  
We can call this the “Warrant Model.”  Others have interpreted it to mean 
that reasonableness of searches and seizures is generally to be measured 
independently of whether a warrant was used, the Warrant Clause telling us 
only what requirements must be met if a warrant is used.  We can call this 
the “Reasonableness Model.”  The U.S. Supreme Court has never clearly 
settled upon either view.  Instead, it has paid lip service to the Warrant Model 
while vacillating back and forth between the two.  Moreover, adherents of 
each view can find some support in the historical record surrounding 
adoption of the Fourth Amendment. 
A. THE WARRANT AND REASONABLENESS MODELS 
In Craig Bradley’s helpful taxonomy, “there are two, and only two, ways 
of looking at the [F]ourth [A]mendment” that will allow for coherence of 
doctrine and consistency of application.9  What Bradley calls “the ‘no lines’ 
and ‘bright line’ approaches”10 roughly equate to the Reasonableness Model 
and the Warrant Model.  Pursuant to the former, “[a] search and seizure must 
be reasonable, considering all relevant factors on a case-by-case basis.”11  
Pursuant to the latter, “a warrant is always required for every search and 
seizure when it is practicable to obtain one.”12 
 
7  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
8  See id. 
9  Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1471 
(1985). 
10  Id. 
11  Id.  These factors would include the level of suspicion by officials, whether they 
obtained a warrant, any exigency, the nature and level of intrusion, and the gravity of the 
offense being investigated.  See id.  
12  Id. (emphasis omitted).  This is not to say that these are the only two possible models 
for the Fourth Amendment.  For example, Professor Erik Luna has posited an “individual 
sovereignty” model and an “antidiscrimination” model, favoring the former.  See Erik G. Luna, 
Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787, 789 (1999).  Professor Scott Sundby has 
advanced a model based on “reciprocal government-citizen trust.”  See Scott E. Sundby, 
“Everyman”‘s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and 
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Both models have found expression in the Supreme Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  Each has, on occasion, held dominance.  Indeed, 
to use Justice Scalia’s evocative language, the Court has “lurched back and 
forth between imposing a categorical warrant requirement and looking to 
reasonableness alone.”13  For example, in United States v. Lefkowitz, in 1932, 
the Court articulated the warrant preference rule: “[T]he informed and 
deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered to issue warrants as to 
what searches and seizures are permissible under the Constitution are to be 
preferred over the hurried action of officers and others who may happen to 
make arrests.”14  Yet, a mere fifteen years later, in Harris v. United States, 
the Court embraced the Reasonableness Model: “The test of reasonableness 
cannot be stated in rigid and absolute terms . . . The Fourth Amendment has 
never been held to require that every valid search and seizure be effected 
under the authority of a search warrant.”15  Less than a year later, the Court 
returned to a reading of the Fourth Amendment more consistent with the 
Warrant Model.  It declared that “[w]hen the right of privacy must reasonably 
yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not 
by a policeman or government enforcement agent,” unless “exceptional 
circumstances” exist.16  But barely two years after that, in United States v. 
Rabinowitz, the Court reversed course once more: 
[T]he Constitution does not say that the right of the people to be secure in their persons 
should not be violated without a search warrant if it is practicable for the officers to 
procure one.  The mandate of the Fourth Amendment is that the people shall be secure 
against unreasonable searches.17 
Rabinowitz provided something of a showcase for the battle between the 
two views.  For the majority, espousing the Reasonableness Model, Justice 
Minton set forth the proposition that the Fourth Amendment requires 
reasonableness, not warrants: “The relevant test is not whether it is 
reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was 
 
Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1754 (1994).  But only the Warrant and Reasonableness 
Models attempt to solve the textual puzzle at the heart of the Fourth Amendment. 
13  California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
14  285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932). 
15  331 U.S. 145, 150 (1947). 
16  Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).  See also McDonald v. United States, 
335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948) (“A search without a warrant demands exceptional 
circumstances . . .”); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948) (“To provide the 
necessary security against unreasonable intrusions upon the private lives of individuals, the 
framers of the Fourth Amendment required adherence to judicial processes wherever 
possible.”). 
17  339 U.S. 56, 65 (1950). 
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reasonable.  That criterion in turn depends upon the facts and 
circumstances—the total atmosphere of the case.”18  Justice Frankfurter, 
writing for himself and Justice Jackson in dissent, just as clearly set forth a 
succinct statement of the Warrant Model: 
When the Fourth Amendment outlawed “unreasonable searches” and then went on to 
define the very restricted authority that even a search warrant issued by a magistrate 
could give, the framers said with all the clarity of the gloss of history that a search is 
“unreasonable” unless a warrant authorizes it, barring only exceptions justified by 
absolute necessity.19 
While the Warrant Model became ascendant in the late 1960s and early 
1970s,20 the debate continues sixty-six years after Rabinowitz.  Different 
members of the same Court express the Fourth Amendment’s central 
requirement in terms of either the Reasonableness Model or the Warrant 
Model, depending on his or her preferences.  Indeed, one can often discern 
from a Supreme Court opinion whether a Fourth Amendment claimant will 
win or lose based on whether, at the outset of its Fourth Amendment analysis, 
the Court describes the Amendment’s requirements in terms of the 
Reasonableness Model or the Warrant Model.  To take just a recent example, 
here is how the majority opinion in City of Los Angeles v. Patel, written by 
Justice Sotomayor, explained the provision’s requirements: “Based on [this] 
constitutional text, the Court has repeatedly held that ‘searches conducted 
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or a magistrate 
judge, are per se unreasonable subject only to a few specifically established 
and well-delineated exceptions.’”21  Predictably, the Court found a Fourth 
Amendment violation.22 And here is how Justice Scalia in dissent described 
the same requirements: 
[I]n an effort to guide courts in applying the Search-and-Seizure Clause’s indeterminate 
reasonableness standard . . . we have used the Warrant Clause as a guidepost for 
assessing the reasonableness of a search, and have erected a framework of presumptions 
applicable to broad categories of searches . . . .  Our case law has repeatedly recognized, 
however, that these are mere presumptions, and the only constitutional requirement is 
that a search be reasonable.23 
The result is an uneasy truce.  The Warrant Model has won out but only 
 
18  Id. at 66. 
19  Id. at 70 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
20  See Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 197, 204 (1993) (“The warrant preference rule grew in stature during the latter half of 
the 1960’s and the early 1970’s.”). 
 21  135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015) (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009)) 
(alterations omitted). 
22  See id. at 2456. 
23  Id. at 2458 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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“rhetorically,”24 and the warrant requirement is shot through with so many 
different amorphous exceptions—more than twenty, according to Bradley 
writing thirty years ago25—that it is the Reasonableness Model that is truly 
ascendant.26  No wonder that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been the 
subject of pejoratives by so many who have written about it.27 
B. HISTORICAL SUPPORT FOR THE WARRANT AND 
REASONABLENESS MODELS 
The Fourth Amendment cannot “be read as [it] might be read by a man 
who knows English but who has no knowledge of the history that gave rise 
to the words.”28  Some have looked to this history for a way out of the 
wilderness.  All agree that the Warrant Clause clearly forbids general 
warrants, and history supports the notion that, by 1791, general warrants were 
almost uniformly seen as unlawful.29  Beyond that, unfortunately, the 
historical evidence regarding what else the Fourth Amendment requires is 
ambiguous.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, each camp can claim that the evidence 
points to its preferred Fourth Amendment model. 
1. History and the Reasonableness Model 
The idea that history supports a model of the Fourth Amendment that 
downplays warrants and plays up reasonableness has been most completely 
and robustly set forth by Professor Akhil Amar.  In his seminal piece, Fourth 
 
24  California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
25  Bradley, supra note 9, at 1473. 
26  See Maclin, supra note 20, at 205 (“[T]he Court . . . formulates Fourth Amendment 
rules around an ad hoc test, and provides only occasional lip service to the warrant preference 
rule.”). 
27  See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits 
of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1149, 1149 
(1998) (“a mess”); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
757, 757 (1994) (“an embarrassment”); Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant 
Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473, 475 (1991) 
(“mired in confusion and contradiction”); Bradley, supra note 9, at 1468 (a “tarbaby”); David 
E. Steinberg, The Uses and Misuses of Fourth Amendment History, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 581, 
598 (2008) (“arbitrary, inconsistent, and ultimately incoherent”); Lloyd L. Weinreb, 
Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 49 (1974) (“unstable and 
unconvincing”).  See also Luna, supra note 12, at 787–88 (“[E]ach doctrine is more duct tape 
on the Amendment’s frame and a step closer to the junkyard.”). 
28  United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
29  See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 637–58. 
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Amendment First Principles,30 and in follow-up pieces,31 he argued not only 
that warrants were not generally required for searches and seizures at the time 
of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, but also that warrants were 
actually disfavored, because a warrant immunized the government official 
from a suit for trespass. 
Amar first staked out the textual high ground: “The words of the Fourth 
Amendment really do mean what they say.  They do not require warrants, 
even presumptively, for searches and seizures.”32  After all, the negative 
phrasing of the Warrant Clause (“no warrant[] shall issue”) itself suggests 
that the Amendment should be read as disfavoring, not favoring, warrants.33  
He also pointed out that a number of different types of warrantless searches 
and seizures were permissible in 1791: arrests,34 searches incident thereto,35 
and searches aboard ships.36  He further asserted that searches performed 
without warrants could be justified ex post if contraband or stolen items were 
found.37 
Amar argued that the language of the Fourth Amendment disfavors 
warrants for good reason: warrants were issued in ex parte proceedings by a 
judge “and had the purpose and effect of precluding any common law 
trespass suit the aggrieved target might try to bring before a local jury.”38  
 
30  Amar, supra note 27. 
31  See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST 
PRINCIPLES (1997);  see also Akhil Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of 
Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53, 55–60 (1996) [hereinafter Amar, Writs of Assistance]; 
Akhil Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1097, 
1106–11 (1998). 
32  Amar, supra note 27, at 761. 
33 See id. at 774; see also TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION: SEARCH, SEIZURE, AND SURVEILLANCE AND FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 43 
(1969) (asserting that the Fourth Amendment was designed “to prohibit the	  oppressive	  use	  
of	  warrants”	  and	  leave	  warrantless	  searches	  and	  seizures	  unregulated).	  
34  See Amar, supra note 27, at 764. 
35  See id. at 764–66.  Search-incident-to-arrest authority surely existed in the eighteenth 
century but it arguably was not as extensive as is widely thought.  See Michael J.Z. 
Mannheimer, The Contingent Fourth Amendment, 64 EMORY L.J. 1229, 1252–53 (2015). 
36  See Amar, supra note 27, at 766–67.  Amar relies upon the Collection Act of 1789 for 
the proposition that warrantless searches of ship comported with the Fourth Amendment.  Id.  
However, reliance upon an Act of Congress, even one passed by the First Congress, to inform 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment is particularly hazardous.  See infra notes 193–241 and 
accompanying text. 
37  See Amar, supra note 27, at 767.  There is a good deal of dispute over this proposition.  
Compare Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
547, 647–48 (1999) (taking issue with Amar’s account), with Fabio Arcila, Jr., The Death of 
Suspicion, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1275, 1316–24 (2010) (supporting Amar’s account). 
38  Amar, supra note 27, at 772; accord Arcila, Jr., supra note 37, at 1284 (“[T]he Framers 
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Regulation of federal searches and seizures, he argued, would come about as 
a result of after-the-fact remedial action by local juries in tort suits.39  As 
such, warrants were a bad thing, not a good thing, given that they immunized 
officers from suit even where a search or seizure turned out to be flagrantly 
unreasonable.40  Amar concluded “that the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth 
Amendment is not warrants but reasonableness.”41 
As attractive as Amar’s account seems at first blush, it is flawed when 
one digs deeper.  As will be seen,42 during the writs-of-assistance controversy 
in colonial North America in the 1760s, specific warrants were generally held 
up by the colonists as the sine qua non of a lawful search.  If Amar’s account 
were correct, James Otis, the attorney for the Boston merchants who first 
fought the writs of assistance in 1760, should have argued that British 
customs agents were entitled to no warrants at all.  Instead, he argued that 
they were entitled to specific warrants.43  Likewise, colonial courts should 
not have offered to issue writs of assistance as specific warrants, as several 
did.44  Rather, they should have refused to issue writs at all. 
Even putting this to one side, Amar’s historical account is implausible.  
The keystone of his claim that warrants were disfavored is that the bulk of 
search-and-seizure policy was to be determined ex post by juries on a case-
by-case basis.  But intricate sets of rules—common-law and statutory—
regarding when warrants were and were not required were already in place at 
the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment.45  These rules allowed 
arrests and searches without warrants in some circumstances and required 
warrants in others.46  True, where there was no warrant to immunize the 
person conducting the search or seizure, the jury determined whether the 
search or seizure was reasonable.  But to say that the common law posited 
the jury as the principal architect of search-and-seizure policy captures only 
a piece of the picture, and minimizes the extent to which the common law 
kept a good many cases from juries by providing for search and seizure via 
warrant. 
 
sought to limit access to warrants because they immunized officers from suits challenging the 
propriety of their searches.”). 
39  See Amar, supra note 27, at 774. 
40  See id. (“[A] lawful warrant would provide . . . an absolute defense in any subsequent 
trespass suit.”). 
41  Id. at 771. 
42  See infra Section II.A. 
43  See infra text accompanying notes 92–95. 
44  See infra text accompanying notes 112, 114–115. 
45  See Mannheimer, supra note 35, at 1246–56, 1261–62. 
46  Id.  
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Moreover, the founding generation understood as well as we do that tort 
suits are a blunt instrument of regulation and that after-the-fact remedies 
could offer only imperfect redress.47  Indeed, this very argument was made 
amidst the writs-of-assistance controversy, likely by Otis himself, in a 
column published in the Boston Gazette on January 4, 1762.48  Otis asked 
what “reparation” a petty officer would make “after he has put a family . . . to 
the utmost confusion and terror . . . [without] just grounds of suspicion.”49  
He continued, 
is it enough to say, that damages may be recover’d against him in the law?  I hope 
indeed this will always be the case; — but are we perpetually to be expos’d to outrages 
of this kind, [and] to be told for our only consolation, that we must be perpetually 
seeking to the courts of law for redress?  Is not this vexation itself?50 
The risk of under-deterrence is amplified when one considers how 
unlikely it was that the victim of a purportedly unlawful search would bring 
a tort action.  Amar can point to only a handful of reported cases in British 
North America in which such an action was brought.51  The showcase 
litigation for his theory, instead, is the Wilkesite set of cases, a series of 
litigations brought in Britain against Crown officials.52  The plaintiffs in those 
cases, however, were a prominent Member of Parliament and his close 
associates.  Much as those cases might have set a precedent and deterred 
future Crown officials from violating the rights of all British subjects,53 it is 
unlikely that search-and-seizure law can be fine-tuned based solely on tort 
suits brought by the well-placed few with the resources and wherewithal to 
bring such actions. 
 
47  See Davies, supra note 37, at 589 (“Like modern judges, the Framers understood that 
no post-search remedy could adequately restore the breached security of the house.”). 
48  See JOSIAH QUINCY, JUNIOR, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE 
SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY BETWEEN 1761 
AND 1772 488–94 (1865) (reprinting the column and speculating that Otis had written it); see 
also Davies, supra note 37, at 561 n.20 (surmising that Otis wrote the column). 
49  QUINCY, supra note 48, at 490. 
50  Id.  Otis also pointed out that some intangible harms, such as poor treatment by a petty 
executive officer during a search, were non-compensable.  See id. (“[M]ay we not be insolently 
treated by our petty tyrants in some ways, for which the law prescribes no redress?”). 
51  See Amar, supra note 27, at 786 n.105.  If Amar were correct, “there should be 
thousands of such cases, and evidence of them should be easy to find.  The only evidence so 
far produced is [a] ‘smattering of nineteenth-century cases,’ . . . not the avalanche of cases that 
a flourishing system would generate.”  Allen & Rosenberg, supra note 27, at 1176–77. 
52  See Amar, supra note 27, at 772, 775–76, 797–98. 
53  See id. at 797 (observing that the Wilkes plaintiffs “had recovered a King’s ransom from 
civil juries to teach arrogant officialdom a lesson and to deter future abuse”). 
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2. History and the Warrant Model 
Some of those who advocate for the Warrant Model agree that history 
offers a guide.  But they tend to pull the camera back on the specific practices 
of the framers in order to view the general zeitgeist during the framing period 
vis-à-vis search-and-seizure policy.54  As Justice Frankfurter remarked in his 
famed Rabinowitz dissent, the Fourth Amendment “was the answer of the 
Revolutionary statesmen to the evils of searches without warrants and 
searches with warrants unrestricted in scope.  Both were deemed 
‘unreasonable.’”55  The colonists recoiled at the use of general warrants.56  
But it would make little sense to think that Americans during the framing 
period reacted so violently to general warrants yet calmly accepted searches 
and seizures performed with no warrant at all.  The chief vice of both general 
warrants and warrantless searches and seizures is that they afforded unlimited 
discretion to low-level executive officials: constables and customs collectors.  
Both general warrants and unwarranted searches and seizures “place[d] the 
liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer.”57  Thus, the 
argument goes, “[t]he Fourth Amendment was . . . adopted for the purpose of 
checking discretionary police authority.”58  The idea was to “‘place[] the 
magistrate as a buffer between the police and the citizenry.’”59  Thus, to 
 
54  See Maclin, supra note 20, at 213 (exhorting the Court not to “be preoccupied with the 
permissible law enforcement practices of the eighteenth century” but rather to “focus on the 
‘underlying vision’ of the amendment” (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 537 (2d ed. 1988) (emphasis omitted)); Tracey Maclin, The Complexity 
of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. REV. 925, 958 (1997) (“History is 
relevant not because it offers irrefutable answers to current constitutional questions, but 
because it provides guidance on the broad values that underlie the Constitution’s text.”). 
55  United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
56  Hon. M. Blane Michael, Reading the Fourth Amendment: Guidance from the Mischief 
that Gave It Birth, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 905, 921 (2010). 
57  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis., J., dissenting) (quoting 
Otis’s argument against Writs of Assistance). 
58  Michael, supra note 56, at 921–22; see also Maclin, supra note 20, at 229 (“The framers 
declared a broad principle about government power in guaranteeing freedom from 
unreasonable search and seizure.  Under that broad principle, government authority and 
discretion would not go unchecked.”). 
59  Maclin, supra note 20, at 213–14 (quoting Jacob W. Landynski, In Search of Justice 
Black’s Fourth Amendment, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 462 (1976)).  In a variation on this 
theme, Professor Thomas Davies has contended that the Reasonableness Clause referred only 
to the inherent illegality of searches pursuant to general warrants, see Davies, supra note 37, 
at 551, but that warrantless searches and arrests were understood as being regulated by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, see Thomas Y. Davies, Correcting Search-and-
Seizure History: Now-Forgotten Common-Law Warrantless Arrest Standards and the 
Original Understanding of “Due Process of Law,” 77 MISS. L.J. 1, 7–8 (2007).  In another 
variation, Professor David Steinberg has asserted that the Fourth Amendment was intended to 
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Warrant Clause advocates, the Fourth Amendment is largely about the checks 
and balances that go with separation of powers: controlling executive 
discretion through judicial superintendence. 
But while a preference for judicial oversight of petty executive authority 
can be gleaned from the colonial opposition to writs of assistance and general 
search warrants, such a preference cannot be stated as a general rule 
applicable to all searches and seizures.  First, warrantless arrests were 
common during the framing period.  As long as a felony had in fact been 
committed, and there was reasonable grounds to believe the arrestee had 
committed it, warrantless arrest was perfectly acceptable.60  Indeed, even the 
felony-in-fact requirement was breaking down during the late eighteenth 
century.61  Warrantless arrests for felonies could also be made in most 
jurisdictions based on “[t]he common Fame of the Country,” that is, based 
on general reputation.62  Moreover, in most jurisdictions warrantless arrest of 
a person who was actually guilty of a felony was always justified, even if 
based upon no suspicion at all.63  Warrantless arrests could also be made in 
some jurisdictions for such lesser offenses as vagrancy,64 “disturbing the 
Minister in Time of Divine Service,”65 “profane[] swear[ing],”66 “begging,”67 
prostitution,68 fortune-telling and practicing other “crafty science,”69 
“‘hawking’ and ‘peddling,’”70 and violations of the Sabbath.71  None of these 
crime categories requires the kind of swift action that would make obtaining 
 
require warrants, but only with respect to searches of houses.  See David E. Steinberg, The 
Original Understanding of Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1051, 1053 
(2004) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment was intended to proscribe only a single, discrete activity—
physical searches of houses pursuant to a general warrant, or no warrant at all.”). 
60  See Davies, supra note 37, at 633–35. 
61  See Mannheimer, supra note 35, at 1238–40, 1248–49. 
62  See id. at 1251.  However, if a subsequent tort action were brought for false arrest, the 
defendant was required to introduce “evidence . . . that such fame had some probable 
ground.”).  See id. at 1251 n.100 (quoting JAMES PARKER, CONDUCTOR GENERALIS: OR, THE 
OFFICE, DUTY AND AUTHORITY OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, HIGH-SHERIFFS, UNDER-SHERIFFS, 
CORONERS, CONSTABLES, GAOLERS, JURY-MEN, AND OVERSEERS OF THE POOR 26 (1764)). 
63  See Mannheimer, supra note 35, at 1255. 
64  See id. at 1251–52. 
65  Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case 
Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago 
Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239, 305, 306 n.205 (2002). 
66  Id. at 332 n.284. 
67  Id. 
68  See id. at 343 n.322. 
69  Id. 
70  Id. at 353. 
71  See id. at 350. 
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a warrant impracticable, at least not as a general matter.  The law was unclear 
even as to whether doors could be broken to make a warrantless arrest.72  
Based on this evidence, adherents of the Warrant Model have a tough row to 
hoe in claiming that the Fourth Amendment was understood in 1791 as 
generally requiring warrants for seizures. 
Warrant Model proponents are on somewhat firmer footing when it 
comes to searches, but even here, they falter.  Even assuming that warrants 
were consistently thought during the framing period to be required for 
searches of homes, there was no universal rule beyond that.  For example, 
customs statutes enacted by Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia during 
the 1780s required that officials obtain a warrant to enter into “warehouses” 
and “storehouses” as well as dwellings.73  But customs statutes in 
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania during the same period permitted 
warrantless searches of such premises, requiring warrants only for searches 
of houses.74  Fans of the Warrant Model cannot explain why, within a span 
of ten years, warrants for searches of non-premises dwellings went from 
being an unnecessary encumbrance on customs officials to being a 
constitutional necessity. 
More broadly, the views of those who advocate a Warrant Model of the 
Fourth Amendment are in very serious tension with the fact that the 
Amendment was directed to the federal legislative branch, not the executive 
or the judicial.  When James Madison initially proposed the Bill of Rights in 
the House of Representatives, he contemplated that its provisions would be 
interspersed, each tacked onto the provision of the body of the Constitution 
it was meant to alter, rather than added as a separate set of provisions at the 
end.75  The Fourth Amendment was not intended to be added to Article II, 
which one might expect if it were primarily a check on the executive.  Nor 
was it destined for Article III, which one would imagine it would be if 
intended as a direction to judges about when to issue warrants.  Rather, it was 
originally contemplated that the Fourth Amendment would find a home in 
Article I, § 9,76 along with the other prohibitions on the legislative branch.77 
That the Fourth Amendment was directed to the national lawmaking 
body tells us something very significant.  For the Amendment is not a 
 
72  See Mannheimer, supra note 35, at 1242–44. 
73  See id. at 1262. 
74  See id. 
75  See Edward Hartnett, A “Uniform and Entire” Constitution; Or, What if Madison Had 
Won?, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 252–53 (1998). 
76  See, e.g., Hartnett, supra note 75, at 258–59; see also THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: 
THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 223 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997). 
77  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
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direction to judges about when to issue warrants or to executive officials 
about how to search and seize.  It is a constraint on Congress’s power to make 
law regarding searches, seizures, and warrants.  That power lay with the 
States.  The Fourth Amendment, it turns out, is more about federalism than 
separation of powers. 
II.  LOCAL CONTROL OF SEARCH-AND-SEIZURE LAW: FROM EMPIRE TO 
CONFEDERATION TO REPUBLIC 
History does not neatly dovetail with either the Warrant or the 
Reasonableness Models.  That is to say, history cannot tell us when warrants 
are required by the Fourth Amendment.  Are they required for every search 
or seizure, except where impracticable?  Or are they required only when a 
search would be unreasonable without one?  History cannot provide an 
answer to this question because it is the wrong question.  Both Warrant Model 
and Reasonableness Model enthusiasts have assumed that the Fourth 
Amendment provides a single, uniform rule as to when warrants are required.  
However, history provides a third model of the Fourth Amendment that has 
been overlooked.  Members of the framing generation did not demonstrate 
an overriding preference for warrants, but neither did they wish to subject 
federal searches and seizures to a general requirement of reasonableness.  
Rather, what they contemplated was local control over federal searches and 
seizures. 
The thirty-year period from 1761 to 1791 saw different expressions of 
the idea that search-and-seizure authority should fall under local, not central, 
control.  This occurred under three different types of central government: 
imperial, confederal, and federal.  First, during the writs-of-assistance 
controversy after 1761, local judges throughout the continent refused to issue 
such writs, in defiance of orders from the Crown, and one colonial legislature 
unsuccessfully tried to statutorily bar the writs.78  Then, in the brief Articles 
of Confederation period, much of the state legislation ratifying the 1783 
confederal impost explicitly held federal officers to differing search-and-
seizure restrictions.  Finally, two pieces of early federal legislation explicitly 
held federal officers to the standards of the States in which they operated, 
demonstrating that such a patchwork approach was unremarkable in the early 
Republic and suggesting that adherence to state law was itself considered the 
 
 78  It appears that the quest for local control over search-and-seizure policy began in some 
colonies much earlier.  See, e.g., CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 194 (“Between 1620 and 1700, 
New England legislators withheld the power to search or seize for many applications for which 
Parliament permitted it . . . .”).  I begin with the writs-of-assistance controversy of the 1760s 
because the episode was “[t]he driving force behind the adoption of the [Fourth] Amendment.”  
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990).  
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constitutional floor set by the Bill of Rights. 
A. LOCAL CONTROL UNDER THE EMPIRE: THE WRITS-OF-
ASSISTANCE CONTROVERSY 
It is almost uniformly thought that the writs-of-assistance controversy 
of the 1760s was the single most important episode in colonial history to shed 
light on the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.79  A close examination of 
this episode shows that the touchstone of the colonists’ complaints about the 
writs was the loss of local control over search-and-seizure policy: that despite 
their unquestionable legality in England, the writs were illegal in the 
colonies.  Moreover, not every colony agreed that the writs were unlawful, 
and they were actually issued in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, 
and South Carolina. 
Writs of assistance were akin to general search warrants.80  However, 
they were especially pernicious in at least three respects.  First, they could be 
obtained by customs officials as a matter of course, without any allegation of 
illegal activity.81  Second, they were issued “without judicial superintendence 
and without the possibility of refusal.”82 Finally, they did not expire upon 
seizure and return of stolen or untaxed goods but, instead, were operative 
until six months after the death of the monarch under which they were 
issued.83 
 
 79  See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Can You Handle the Truth?: The Framers Preserved 
Common-Law Criminal Arrest and Search Rules in “Due Process of Law”—“Fourth 
Amendment Reasonableness” is Only a Modern, Destructive, Judicial Myth, 43 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 51, 86 (2010) (observing that “[t]he controversy over the use of general writs of 
assistance for revenue searches of houses was the far more important catalyst” for the Fourth 
Amendment, as compared to the Wilkesite cases).  But see Amar, supra note 27, at 772 
(asserting that the series of English Wilkesite cases of the 1760s “and not the 1761 Boston 
writs of assistance controversy . . . was the paradigm search and seizure case for Americans”).  
However, Amar seems later to have acknowledged, at least in part, the significance of the 
writs-of-assistance controversy in interpreting the Fourth Amendment.  See Amar, Writs of 
Assistance, supra note 31, at 76–77 (acknowledging that the “later writs-of-assistance 
controversies” outside of Massachusetts after 1767 “were . . . more significant at the time than 
the 1761 Boston cases”).  For a succinct description of the Wilkesite cases and their impact in 
the colonies, see Davies, supra note 37, at 562–65. 
 80  See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 378 (observing that “[t]he customs service in 
Massachusetts” had used such “writs as general warrants”); O.M. Dickerson, Writs of 
Assistance as a Cause of the Revolution, in THE ERA OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 40, 40 
(Richard B. Morris ed., 1939) (“The writs were general in form . . . .”). 
 81  See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 380. 
 82  Id.. 
 83  See id. at 380–81; Dickerson, supra note 80, at 40; NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY 
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 54 
(1937) (“The more dangerous element of the writ of assistance . . . was that it was not 
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Such writs were used in Massachusetts beginning in 1755 by customs 
officials searching for untaxed goods.84  However, a controversy arose with 
the death of King George II in late 1760 and the consequent expiration of all 
extant writs of assistance in the spring of 1761.85  When new writs were 
requested in Massachusetts by English authorities, a group of Boston 
merchants resisted and hired prominent Boston attorney James Otis to 
represent them.86  In the proceeding before the Massachusetts Superior Court 
that became known as Paxton’s Case, Otis provided the first full account of 
the perniciousness of general warrants and offered a persuasive defense of 
specific warrants as an alternative.87  He argued: “For Felonies an officer may 
break, upon Proscess [sic], and oath. — i.e., by a Special Warrant to search 
such a House, sworn to be suspected, and good Grounds of suspicion 
appearing.”88 
Paxton’s Case is best viewed as the culmination of a century-long push 
in Massachusetts toward local control of search-and-seizure policy.  As 
Professor William Cuddihy pointed out, Otis’s legal arguments in favor of 
specific warrants were severely flawed.  Neither statutory nor English 
common law demanded that warrants be specific.89  Rather, general warrants 
and writs of assistance were the norm in Britain, not an aberration.90  
Moreover, it was unmistakably clear that English law applied to 
Massachusetts in that respect.91  Otis’s mistake—or, perhaps, his gambit—
was to conflate established English law with evolving Massachusetts law.  
The colony had enacted local legislation that, over the course of the prior 
 
returnable at all after execution, but was good as a continuous license and authority during the 
whole lifetime of the reigning sovereign.”); QUINCY, supra note 48, at 397 n.5 (“Writs of 
assistance continue in force until the demise of the Crown, and for six month afterwards.”); 
see also CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 393 (observing that “regular search warrants were of limited 
duration” under English law). 
 84  See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 378–79; Dickerson, supra note 80, at 40. 
 85  See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 380–81; QUINCY, supra note 48, at 414 n.2; Dickerson, 
supra note 80, at 40. 
 86  See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 381; Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John 
Adams, his Era, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 992 (2011). 
 87  See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 382 (observing that Otis’s “proclamation that only 
specific writs were legal was the first recorded declaration of the central idea to the specific 
warrant clause”); Clancy, supra note 86, at 992 (“[N]o authority preceding Otis had articulated 
so completely the framework for proper search and seizure practices that was ultimately 
embodied in the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause.”). 
88  QUINCY, supra note 48, at 471. 
89  See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 386–94. 
90  See id. at 392 (observing that “writs of assistance typified [British] law”). 
91  See id. at 388–89. 
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century, had become increasingly hostile toward general warrants.92  Otis’s 
argument elided the growing gulf between Massachusetts law and English 
law.93  Only according to the former were specific warrants favored.94  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Otis lost and the Massachusetts Superior Court ruled 
that writs of assistance could issue.95 
In his January 4, 1762 Boston Gazette piece, Otis attempted to support 
his argument that customs officials in Massachusetts should be required to 
use specific warrants, despite the fact that they were permitted to use general 
warrants in England.  His argument focused on the relative degree of control 
over customs officials in the respective locales.  In England, he pointed out, 
customs officials were subject to the complete control of the court of 
exchequer, even extending to physical discipline when necessary: “In 
England the exchequer has the power of controuling them in every respect; 
and even of inflicting corporal punishment upon them for mal-conduct . . . .”96  
As such, they were accountable to the court of exchequer and were called to 
account on a weekly basis for their conduct.97  Accordingly, the people had 
effective control over customs officials in England and had “a short and easy 
method of redress in case of injury receiv’d from them.”98  But no such 
“checks and restrictions” existed in Massachusetts, “and therefore the writ of 
assistance ought to be look’d upon as a different thing there, from what it is 
here.”99  As Otis put it, the writ of assistance gave the customs officer greater 
power in Massachusetts than in England, “greater because 
UNCONTROUL’D—and can a community be safe with an uncontroul’d power 
lodg’d in the hands of such officers[?]”100 
It is in the colonial response to Paxton’s Case where we see most 
dramatically a push toward local control of search-and-seizure policy.  Not 
only did the local responses generally frustrate the policy of the central 
 
 92  See id. at 392 (“Hostility to general warrants had been increasingly evident in the 
colony’s legislation on search and seizure for more than a century.”).  
 93  See id. (“Otis ignored mounting disparities in the legislation of Massachusetts and 
Britain toward search and seizure . . . .”). 
 94  See id. at 393 (“[T]he specific warrant . . . reigned supreme only in Massachusetts . . . .”); 
see also Maclin, supra note 54, at 945–46 (observing that the writs “contradicted local law”). 
 95  See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 395; QUINCY, supra note 48, at 414 n.2; Dickerson, supra 
note 80, at 40. 
96  QUINCY, supra note 48, at 493. 
97  See id. (“[T]hey are the proper officers of that court, and are accountable to it as often 
as it shall call them to account, and they do in fact account to it for money receiv’d, and for 
their BEHAVIOR, once every week . . . .”). 
98  Id. 
99  Id. 
100  Id. at 494. 
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government, but the responses differed in important respects by colony.  In 
Massachusetts, a legislative response was attempted.  The legislature there 
passed a bill in March 1762 to nullify the decision in Paxton’s Case by 
essentially transforming writs of assistance into specific warrants.101  The bill 
would have “limited the duration of writs of assistance to seven days, based 
them on oath, and required that they designate the informer, the accused 
owner of contraband, and the alleged place of concealment.”102  That is to 
say, it would have transformed general writs of assistance by instilling them 
with the salient characteristics of specific warrants.  Although the measure 
was vetoed by the governor, it stands as an example of “an effort to compel 
British customs officers to observe the restraints on searches that their local 
counterparts already accepted.”103  Thus, the Massachusetts legislature 
sought to subject British customs officials to the same constraints that bound 
local officials. 
Responses in other colonies were varied.  After passage of the 
Townshend Acts in 1767,104 aimed in part at endowing colonial courts with 
jurisdiction to issue writs of assistance,105 most of the colonial judiciaries 
were forced to confront the issue, and they did so in diverse ways.  In a large 
number of colonies, judges either refused to grant the writs, ignored requests 
for them, or engaged in dilatory tactics in the hopes that customs officials 
would give up.  Courts in Maryland chose largely to ignore the requests.106  
The Rhode Island Superior Court used indefinite delay to frustrate customs 
officials.107  Like those in its neighbor to the east, judges in Connecticut also 
“postpone[d] consideration of the writs,” though arguably this was in a good 
faith effort to determine their legality.108 Later, judges in Connecticut 
 
 101  See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 403; QUINCY, supra note 48, at 495–96; Clancy, supra 
note 86, at 1002; Maclin, supra note 54, at 947. 
 102  CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 403.  For the text of the bill, see QUINCY, supra note 48, at 
495–96. 
 103  CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 403–04. 
104  See, e.g., Revenue Act 1767, 7 Geo. 3 c. 46.   
105  See Clancy, supra note 86, at 1003.  
 106  See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 513, 526 (“In Maryland . . . the highest court[] had 
ignored rather than refused requests for the writs.”); accord Joseph R. Frese, Writs of 
Assistance in the American Colonies: 1660–1776, at 246 (1951) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with author); see also Dickerson, supra note 80, at 
62 (observing that Maryland court expressed willingness to issue writ but not until the need 
arose in a particular case). 
 107  See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 514, 524, 526 (“Asked repeatedly for the same writs, 
the Rhode Island Superior Court . . . postponed considering them on grounds that two of its 
members were absent.”); Dickerson, supra note 80, at 50–51; cf. QUINCY, supra note 48, at 
505–06 (concluding that no writs were issued in Rhode Island).  
 108  Accord QUINCY, supra note 48, at 501–04; Dickerson, supra note 80, at 52–53; see 
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responded to requests for writs by offering to issue them as specific 
warrants.109  And in Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court outright refused to 
issue the writs, branding them “illegal,” both because they were general110 
and because they were perpetual.111  As in Connecticut, judges in 
Pennsylvania offered to grant them as specific warrants,112 and did in fact do 
so in particular cases.113 
By contrast, judges in Virginia, Georgia, New York, and South Carolina 
were more equivocal.  Virginia courts, taking a middle-of-the-road approach, 
granted writs that were general but that were acceptable to colonial 
sensibilities in other respects: they were of definite duration rather than 
perpetual and were issued only when based on sworn allegations.114  As in 
Virginia, the judges of Georgia expressed a willingness to issue general writs, 
but refused to do so unless the need arose in a particular case.115  In South 
Carolina, judges initially publicly avoided responding to requests for writs of 
assistance while privately concluding that they were illegal.116  However, in 
1773, the newly reconstituted high court of South Carolina ruled the writs 
legal and issued a number of them.117  In New York, the situation was 
reversed: judges there initially issued writs118 but later practiced the same 
 
CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 514–15; Frese, supra note 106, at 239–40 (quoting the chief justice 
as declaring that “they were not clear that the thing itself was constitutional”). 
 109  See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 520–21, 525. 
 110  See id. at 519; Frese, supra note 106, at 264, 286. 
 111  Accord QUINCY, supra note 48, at 509; see CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 515–16; 
Dickerson, supra note 80, at 58–60. 
 112  See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 525; Dickerson, supra note 80, at 60; Frese, supra note 
106, at 264, 277; see also Davies, supra note 37, at 566 (“[C]olonial judges usually ignored 
or denied the petitions [for writs of assistance] and often described the requested general writs 
as ‘illegal’ notwithstanding specific statutory authority.”). 
 113  See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 519–20; Frese, supra note 106, at 264–68.  
 114  See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 521–22, 525–26; Dickerson, supra note 80, at 67–72.  
Both Quincy and Frese mistakenly referred to these as specific writs.  QUINCY, supra note 48, 
at 510 n.14; Frese, supra note 106, at 270.  However, an essential feature of a specific warrant 
is a “prior designation of a particular person or location to whom or which the warrant [i]s 
confined.”  CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 313.  It is this essential feature that was lacking in the 
writs issued in Virginia pursuant to the Townshend Act.  See Frese, supra note 106, at 270 
(quoting writ as permitting entry “into any House, Shop, Cellar, Warehouse or Room or other 
place where the said goods are suspected to be concealed”) (emphasis added). 
 115  See Frese, supra note 106, at 279; see also CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 523, 525; 
Dickerson, supra note 80, at 65–66. 
 116  See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 518; see also Dickerson, supra note 80, at 66 
(documenting delay by South Carolina court in issuing writs). 
 117  See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 524–25; Davies, supra note 79, at 88; Dickerson, supra 
note 80, at 66–67; Frese, supra note 106, at 289. 
 118  See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 513; Dickerson, supra note 80, at 54.  Quincy first 
observed that writs were issued in New York, but later asserted that the writs in New York 
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kind of intransigence seen in Rhode Island119 and finally outright refused to 
issue them.120 
Thus, judicial reaction to requests for writs of assistance differed by 
colony.  Though it is tempting to see the colonial opposition as uniform, 
unified, and monolithic, the record discloses a more nuanced picture,121 as 
demonstrated in Table 1 below.  Judges in four colonies—Connecticut, 
Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island—either staunchly refused to 
issue the writ or frustrated Crown policy through dilatory tactics and 
subterfuge.  In Georgia, too, judges essentially defied the Crown, paying lip 
service to general warrants by expressing their willingness to approve them 
but only if particular need arose.  In Virginia, judges willingly granted hybrid 
writs that, while general, were acceptable in other ways to colonial 
sensibilities, such as being of limited duration and founded upon specific 
allegations made under oath.  Again, this was done in defiance of Crown 
policy,122 but with more diplomacy.  And in Massachusetts,123 New 
Hampshire,124 New York,125 and South Carolina126 judges actually issued the 
 
were issued as specific warrants. QUINCY, supra note 48, at 507–08, 511 n.15.  This latter 
assertion appears to be incorrect.  The form of the writ issued in New York is reproduced in 
full in Dickerson, and it is phrased as a general warrant.  Dickerson, supra note 80, at 54–55; 
see also CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 513 (showing that the writs issued in New York were 
“phrased as general search warrants”).  Moreover, the court’s order, reproduced in Frese 
demonstrates the breadth of the authority granted: 
[Y]ou are hereby authorized . . . in the Day time to enter . . . any Ship Boat [sic] or other 
Vessell as also into any House Warehouse Shop Cellar or other place in this Colony . . . 
and to seize . . . any kind of Goods or Merchandizes whatsoever prohibited to be 
imported or Exported or whereof the Customs or other Duties have not been and shall 
not be duly paid. 
Supra note 106, at 243 (emphasis added).  
 119  Accord Dickerson, supra note 80, at 58; Frese, supra note 106, at 263–64, 276; see 
CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 523 (“Judges pleaded illness, age, and inclemency of weather for 
absences that precluded a necessary quorum.”).  
 120  See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 526 (“[T]he New York Superior Court [announced] in 
1773 that it had pronounced [the writs] not warranted by law . . . and that it would not 
comply.”); see also Frese, supra note 106, at 277, 285–86. 
 121  See Davies, supra note 79, at 88 (observing that “colonial court rulings” were 
“inconsistent”). 
 122  See Dickerson, supra note 80, at 69 (“Here was apparently a judicial defiance of a 
direction of the attorney general in England and a departure from the known practice of the 
Court of Exchequer.”). 
 123  See Clancy, supra note 86, at 1004 (“Massachusetts continued to issue general writs 
of assistance . . . .”); see also MAURICE H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 468–72 
(1978) (documenting use of writs granted in Massachusetts after 1767). 
 124  See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 509. 
 125  See supra text accompanying notes 116–118.  
 126  See supra text accompanying notes 118–119. 
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writs, although those in the last two States changed their position over time.127 
Table 1. Colonial Courts’ Responses to Crown Officials’ Requests for 
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Judicial intransigence in some colonies was accompanied by foot-
dragging and interference by executive officials.  In one instance, faced with 
indefinite delay by the Rhode Island Superior Court in considering writs, 
customs officials went to the governor, only to be delayed further by the 
actions of the governor, the judge advocate, and a deputy sheriff.128  
Ultimately, a writ was issued as a specific warrant, but night fell before it 
could be executed, allowing locals to remove the sought-after contraband.129  
In Connecticut, the chief justice who had politely declined to issue the writs 
based on doubts about their legality also served as lieutenant governor of the 
colony.130  And when the British attempted “to remove him from his judicial 
office” based on the notion of separation of powers, the people of the colony 
 
 127  It is unclear whether writs were ever issued in New Jersey, but the preponderance of 
scholarly weight indicates that they were not.  Compare CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 512 (“At 
least one writ of assistance . . . operated in New Jersey during the post-Townshend period.”), 
with QUINCY, supra note 48, at 508 (“[T]he records of the court [in New Jersey] which are in 
quite a perfect state, contain no evidence of any writs having been issued . . . .”), and 
Dickerson, supra note 80, at 49 (“There is no evidence that writs were ever applied for in New 
Jersey . . . .”), and Frese, supra note 106, at 244 (“We have no record of a general writ issued 
in New Jersey.”).  It appears that writs of assistance were not requested in the two remaining 
colonies, Delaware and North Carolina.  See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 511–12. 
128  Frese, supra note 106, at 237–39; see also CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 514. 
129  See Frese, supra note 106, at 237–39; CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 514. 
130  Frese, supra note 106, at 242. 
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blocked the attempt.131  In Pennsylvania, the chief justice sought and obtained 
the opinion of the colony’s attorney general, who agreed with him that the 
writs were illegal.132  In Virginia, the governor himself was on the court that 
permitted general but limited writs.133 
As had occurred in Massachusetts, the colonial legislatures sometimes 
became involved.  For example, in Connecticut, the chief justice, opining that 
“the superior court could do nothing contrary to the sense of the people,” 
suggested that the General Assembly of the colony take up the issue of the 
legality of the writs.134  The General Assembly took the chief justice up on 
his proposal, appointed a committee to study the question, and ultimately 
punted based on the committee’s conclusion that the matter “properly 
belonged to the Superior Court.”135  Privately, however, the General 
Assembly “advised the judges not to grant the writs.”136 
Accordingly, the writs-of-assistance controversy represents an episode 
in which local control over search-and-seizure policy was strongly asserted 
against the central government, in this case the Crown.  Paxton’s Case clearly 
held the writs to be legal in Massachusetts, and the Townshend Act likewise 
clearly extended their legality to the rest of the colonies.137  Yet, centralized 
search-and-seizure policy was frustrated, and local policy made supreme, by 
the actions of local officials: legislative, executive, and judicial.  It is 
tempting to look back upon the writs-of-assistance controversy and see a 
widespread revolt by the colonists against the use of general warrants.  With 
all the benefits of hindsight, we know that general warrants were widely 
deemed unlawful by 1791,138 as their prohibition in the Fourth Amendment 
demonstrates.  Yet general warrants were not universally reviled on this side 
of the Atlantic in the 1760s.  Some States continued to use them even after 
Independence.139  And, as shown above, general warrants were issued to 
Crown officials in more than half—six out of ten—colonies for which data 
are available.  A more nuanced view of the writs of assistance controversy 
shows that it was largely about holding Crown officials to whatever standards 
local officials preferred.  True, the specific issue raised by the writs-of-
 
131  Id. 
132  Id. at 245. 
133  Id. at 269. 
134  Id. at 260. 
135  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
136  Id. 
137  See supra text accompanying notes 93, 102–103. 
138  See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 739–42. 
139  See id. at 628 (discussing use of general warrants in early 1780s in Pennsylvania and 
Virginia). 
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assistance controversy—the legality of general warrants—was ultimately 
settled in a uniform way by the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause.  
However, the controversy stands for the more general proposition that the 
colonists sought not continent-wide rules, but simply local control of Crown 
officials. 
The colonial response during the writs of assistance episode also refutes 
Professor Amar’s argument that warrants were seen during the framing 
period as a bad thing, not a good thing.  First, Otis’s central argument in 
Paxton’s Case—the initial colonial response to British assumption of power 
to obtain writs of assistance—was not that British officers must act without 
warrants and hold themselves vulnerable to suit.  Rather, it was that they must 
obtain specific warrants.140  After Otis lost, the attempted legislative response 
in Massachusetts was in the same vein: to allow only those writs of assistance 
that met the requirements of limited duration, oath, and specificity.141  
Moreover, of the four colonies with the strongest judicial reaction against 
issuing writs (Connecticut, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island), 
judges in two (Connecticut and Pennsylvania) issued them or offered to issue 
them as specific warrants instead.142  It is impossible to view their response 
as anti-warrant. 
B. LOCAL CONTROL UNDER THE CONFEDERATION: STATE 
LEGISLATION RATIFYING THE 1783 CONFEDERAL IMPOST 
RESOLUTION 
Americans continued, after the Revolution and before ratification of the 
Constitution, to assert local control over search-and-seizure policy.  
Specifically, during the Articles of Confederation period, state legislation 
ratifying a 1783 confederal impost resolution demonstrates the importance of 
State control over search-and-seizure rules.  On April 18, 1783, the 
Confederation Congress recommended that it be “vested with the power to 
levy duties on certain imported goods, such as rum, tea, sugar, coffee, wine, 
and molasses.”143  The resolution required ratification by each and every State 
 
140  See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text; see also Maclin, supra note 20, at 224 
(“Otis emphasized that the absence of judicial oversight was one of the prime evils inherent in 
the writs.”); Maclin, supra note 54, at 968 (“In his argument against the writs of assistance, 
Otis did not condemn all warrants.  He stated that special or specific warrants were 
reasonable.”).  
141  See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.  
142  See supra notes 107–111 and accompanying text.  
 143  Michael J.Z. Mannheimer, Harmelin’s Faulty Originalism, 14 NEV. L.J. 522, 538 
(2014) (citing 24 J. CONT. CONG. 1774–1789, at 256, 256–57 (1783) reprinted in THE 
RESOLUTION OF CONGRESS OF THE 18TH OF APRIL, 1783: RECOMMENDING THE STATES TO 
INVEST CONGRESS WITH THE POWER TO LEVY AN IMPOST, FOR THE USE OF THE STATES; AND THE 
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before it could take effect.144  The ratifying legislation tells us much about 
the way the rights ultimately expressed in the Fourth Amendment in 1791 
were viewed within the previous decade. 
Eight of the States that passed legislation ratifying the confederal impost 
included therein what can be called “mini-bills of rights” that explicitly 
required that the confederal government abide by certain search-and-seizure 
rules in enforcing the impost regulations.145  Five—Georgia, Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Virginia—required the confederal 
government to obtain a search warrant, though not necessarily a specific one, 
in order “to break open any dwelling house, store or ware-house.”146  
Pennsylvania’s legislation was somewhat less protective than this baseline, 
requiring a warrant (again, not necessarily a specific one) only for “dwelling 
house[s].”147 
The other two States that enacted explicit search-and-seizure constraints 
on the confederal government—North Carolina and Rhode Island—imposed 
more stringent requirements.  First, they included all premises within the 
prohibition.148  Additionally, these two States required that such warrants be 
specific:149 Rhode Island required that the warrant “particularly 
discriminat[e] the dwelling-house, store, ware-house, or other building,”150 
and North Carolina provided that a warrant could be granted with regard to 
“such house” where uncustomed goods were suspected of being.151 
Finally, of the five States that did not include a “mini-Bill of Rights,” 
only New York and New Jersey did not place any implicit constraints on the 
 
LAWS OF THE RESPECTIVE STATES PASSED IN PURSUANCE OF THE SAID RECOMMENDATION, 
TOGETHER WITH REMARKS ON THE RESOLUTIONS OF CONGRESS, AND LAWS OF THE DIFFERENT 
STATES 4 (1787) [hereinafter IMPOST LAWS]).  
 144  IMPOST LAWS, supra note 143, at 6; see Wesley J. Campbell, Commandeering and 
Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J. 1104, 1113 (2013) (discussing similar 1781 resolution); 
see also JACKSON T. MAIN, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION 1781–
1788, at 73 (1961).  Ultimately, the 1783 Impost Resolution did not take effect because New 
York refused to ratify it in a form acceptable to the Confederation Congress.  See Campbell, 
supra note 144, at 1120–26; infra text accompanying notes 163–165. 
145  Mannheimer, supra note 143, at 538; IMPOST LAWS, supra note 143, at 7, 10, 12–13, 
30–31, 40, 42, 44–45, 48.  
146  IMPOST LAWS, supra note 143, at 7, 10, 40, 44, 48 (emphasis omitted). 
147  Id. at 31. 
148  Id. at 13, 42 (Rhode Island: “any . . . other building”; North Carolina: “any other 
place”). 
149  See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 663 (“Like North Carolina, Rhode Island had not only 
tied enforcement of the Congressional impost to warrants but also demanded that those 
warrants be specific.”). 
150  IMPOST LAWS, supra note 143, at 13 (Rhode Island) (emphasis omitted). 
151  Id. at 42 (emphasis omitted). 
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confederal government in collecting the impost.152  The other three required 
that the confederal government follow the respective state constitutions in 
collecting the impost.  Delaware required that “such rules and ordinances for 
collecting and levying the . . . duties . . . be not repugnant to the constitution 
and laws of this state,”153 and Maryland similarly required that “such 
ordinances, regulations and arrangements . . . for the faithful and punctual 
payment and collection of the . . . duties . . . shall not be repugnant to the 
constitution of this state.”154  Connecticut’s legislation set forth this 
requirement in a more roundabout way by directing its citizens to adhere to 
confederal impost regulations except to the extent that they were 
“inconsistent with the constitution and internal police of this state.”155  
Moreover, because the Delaware and Maryland constitutions required the use 
of specific warrants, their legislation ratifying the confederal impost required 
the same.156 
In sum, as illustrated in Table 2 below, ten of the thirteen States in ratifying 
the 1783 confederal impost regulation required confederal authorities to 
obtain warrants supported by oath157 in collecting the impost.  But only four 
of those ten—Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, and Rhode Island—
required, expressly or by necessary implication, that those warrants be 
 
152  Id. at 17–22. 
153  Id. at 32. 
154  Id. at 37. 
155  Id. at 16 (emphasis omitted).  This provision appears incongruous at first blush, for 
Connecticut had no constitution at the time its impost ratification legislation was adopted in 
May 1784.  See George C. Thomas, Time Travel, Hovercrafts, and the Framers: James 
Madison Sees the Future and Rewrites the Fourth Amendment, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1451, 
1465 n.63 (2005).  Apparently, the provision referred to Connecticut’s unwritten constitution 
(i.e., its common law on search and seizure).  See Frisbie v. Butler, 1 Kirby 213 (Conn. 1787), 
(outlawing general warrants based on state common law). 
156  See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 663–64 (“The remaining states simply instructed 
Congress to observe their constitutions in collecting the impost, automatically preventing the 
federal usage of general warrants in Maryland and Delaware.”).  Although general warrants 
were later deemed illegal in Connecticut, see Frisbie v. Butler, 1 Kirby 213 (Conn. 1787), 
(“[T]he warrant in the present case, being general, to search all places, and arrest all persons, 
the complainant should suspect, is clearly illegal . . . .”), at the time the Connecticut impost 
ratification legislation was adopted in May 1784, it appears that general warrants may still 
have been consistent with Connecticut law.  See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 644 (“By 1787, 
Connecticut was the last significant outpost for promiscuous searches and seizures in [New 
England].”). 
157  In addition to those whose impost-ratifying legislation expressly required warrants 
issued only upon oath, both the Maryland and Delaware constitutions, incorporated by 
reference in those States’ legislation, contained this requirement.  See THE COMPLETE BILL OF 
RIGHTS, supra note 76, at 234. 
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specific,158 while the other six did not.  The States also differed as to what 
types of premises could be searched only by warrant: Pennsylvania’s warrant 
requirement applied only to dwellings; Georgia, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, South Carolina, and Virginia applied their requirement to stores 
and warehouses in addition to dwellings; North Carolina, and Rhode Island 
applied it to all buildings; and it is unclear how far Delaware’s and 
Maryland’s respective warrant requirements extended.  In addition, while 
nine of these ten required that searches be conducted in daytime, Delaware 
did not.159  Furthermore, although Connecticut did not require that confederal 
officials obtain warrants before searching, it did require that they adhere to 
state law generally.  Only New Jersey and New York would have left officials 
to their own devices when searching and seizing pursuant to the confederal 
impost legislation.  And because New York refused to ratify the legislation 
unless its own officials (who, obviously, would have to abide by state law) 
would enforce the impost,160 New Jersey stood alone in declining to constrain 
the search-and-seizure authority of confederal officials in enforcing the 
proposed impost legislation. 
Table 2. Search-And-Seizure Constraints Placed by States on 
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158  See Maclin, supra note 54, at 949.  Professor Maclin incorrectly dates the proposed 
impost legislation to 1787 instead of 1783. 
159  See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 747 (“[D]elaware’s legislation after 1776 ignored 
[nighttime searches], neither allowing nor prohibiting.”). 
160  See infra text accompanying notes 164–166. 
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Two conclusions follow.  First, under the Articles, twelve of the thirteen 
States sought to control the search and seizure authority of the central 
government.  Second, they did so in different ways: some expressly required 
warrants while some did not; some required that those warrants be specific 
while some did not; some required warrants for all premises, some for 
dwellings, warehouses, and storehouses, and some only for dwellings; some 
forbade nocturnal searches while some did not; and some laid down explicit 
rules while some required adherence to state law generally.  Thus, as late as 
1786161—five years before the Bill of Rights was adopted—a patchwork of 
search-and-seizure rules, different in significant respects, was contemplated.  
This crazy quilt of rules that varied by State meant that national officials were 
to be constrained in different parts of the country in different ways depending 
upon the State in which they acted.162  Accordingly, Americans of that period 
were quite accustomed to the idea that national officials would be subjected 
to different search-and-seizure rules on a State-by-State basis. 
One might argue that this arrangement under the Articles of 
Confederation is weak evidence of what was contemplated by the 
Constitution.  The Constitution, after all, was developed as an antidote to the 
anemic government under the Articles, a centralizing force in stark contrast 
to the decidedly de-centralizing Articles.  This assertion, however, misses the 
entire point of the Bill of Rights.  The Bill was a concession to the Anti-
Federalist opponents of the Constitution who had feared that it would 
consolidate too much power in the hands of the federal government at the 
expense of the several States.163  While the Constitution represented a move 
toward centralization, the Bill of Rights represented a countervailing step 
toward the kind of de-centralization epitomized by the Articles.  That is to 
say, in much the same way that the centripetal forces inherent in the 
Constitution were areaction to the de-centralizing tendencies of the Articles, 
pulling the Nation together, the centrifugal forces embedded in the Bill of 
Rights were in reaction to the centralizing tendencies of the Constitution, 
 
161  The Rhode Island legislation was passed in 1786.  IMPOST LAWS, supra note 143, at 
11. 
162  Although the collectors of the impost were initially to be appointed by each respective 
State, after having been appointed they were “amendable to, and removable by the United 
States in Congress assembled, alone.”  Id. at 5 (emphasis omitted).  Moreover, if a State failed 
to make appointments within one month after receiving notice, the appointment was to be 
“made by the United States in Congress assembled.”  Id.  Because, after appointment, these 
officials served at the pleasure of Congress, they are properly characterized as national 
officers.  Indeed, that was the main sticking point upon which the impost resolution ultimately 
failed.  See infra text accompanying notes 164–166. 
163  See Mannheimer, supra note 35, at 1278–84. 
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allowing for some differentiation by States to be preserved.  As the 
Constitution drew the Nation in and imposed uniformity, the Bill of Rights 
carved out spheres where variety and diversity could be retained. 
Indeed, the proposed impost law of 1783 is a prime example of why the 
Articles of Confederation failed, but not because of the search-and-seizure 
constraints placed upon the confederal government by the States.  True, the 
Articles of Confederation failed largely because they required unanimous 
consent for any significant legislation, such as the proposed impost.  But 
despite the conditions placed by the States upon the confederal collectors of 
the impost, each State but one was deemed by the Confederation Congress to 
have ratified the proposal.164  Only the purported ratification by New York 
was deemed at such a variance with the impost proposal that it was not 
accepted as a ratification of it.165  New York’s nominal ratification of the 
impost was rejected because New York insisted that the collectors of the 
impost within New York be considered agents of New York, supervised by 
and answerable only to that State.166  Congress deemed congressional 
superintendence over the impost collectors to be “an essential part of the 
plan.”167  To put it another way, the confederal Congress readily accepted the 
condition placed upon ratification of the legislation by eleven of the thirteen 
States that state search-and-seizure policy control collection of the impost.  It 
was only when New York demanded in addition the right to select and 
superintend the personnel responsible for collecting the impost that the 
Congress balked. 
Accordingly, the impost, and in a larger sense, the Articles, were 
doomed because one State refused to entrust national actors with a national 
duty, not because eleven other States required those national actors to play 
by local rules.  To the contrary, the requirement that central officials obey 
local search-and-seizure rules seems to have been uncontroversial.  After all, 
that is precisely what the colonies had sought in the 1760s. 
Finally, observe that the States’ conditional ratification of the 1783 
confederal impost legislation demonstrates a clear preference for warrants, 
 
164  See IMPOST LAWS, supra note 143, at 66 (“All the states except New-York hav[e] in 
pursuance of the recommendation of the 18th [of] April, 1783, granted the impost by acts 
vesting this power, with certain qualifications, exclusively in the United States in Congress 
assembled . . . .”). 
165  See id. at 67 (determining that the New York legislation “so essentially varies from the 
system of impost recommended by the United States in Congress assembled on the 18th day 
of April, 1783, that the said act is not, and cannot be considered as a compliance with the same, 
so as to enable Congress, consistently with the acts of the other states to bring the system into 
operation”). 
166  See Campbell, supra note 144, at 1124. 
167  IMPOST LAWS, supra note 143, at 66; see also Campbell, supra note 144, at 1124. 
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all but eviscerating Professor Amar’s claim that warrants were actually 
disfavored by the framers and ratifiers of the Fourth Amendment.  Ten of the 
thirteen States implicitly or explicitly required that confederal officers obtain 
warrants prior to searching or seizing.168  These measures were passed in 
order to hem in the authority of confederal excise collectors, not to immunize 
them from suit.  If Professor Amar and his adherents were correct, those 
States would have forbidden the use of warrants, leaving confederal officers 
open to common-law tort suits for trespass in state courts.  Instead, they 
required warrants.  Thus, in the decade before the Fourth Amendment was 
adopted, the warrant was viewed primarily as a constraint on central 
authority, not as a get-out-of-jail-free card. 
C. LOCAL CONTROL UNDER THE REPUBLIC: CONTINGENT FEDERAL 
SEARCH-AND-SEIZURE AUTHORITY IN EARLY LEGISLATION 
Two early pieces of federal legislation, the Judiciary Act of 1789 and 
the Militia Act of 1792, specifically granted federal officers the same search-
and-seizure authority that analogous state officers had under the laws of the 
respective States.  That is to say, federal legislation contemplated that federal 
officers would have different search-and-seizure authority depending upon 
the State in which they acted.  Once again, this time following ratification of 
the Constitution, we see the assertion of local norms binding actors of the 
central government vis-à-vis search-and-seizure.  While this falls short of 
definitive proof that the Constitution similarly establishes different limits on 
search-and-seizure authority by State, the absence of any statutory language 
setting a constitutional floor strongly implies that Congress meant these 
statutes to track the constitutional limits on federal search-and-seizure 
authority. 
First, section 33 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, enacted by the First 
Congress, provided that 
for any crime or offence against the United States, the offender may, by any justice or 
judge of the United States, or by any justice of the peace, or other magistrate of justice 
of any of the United States where he may be found agreeably to the usual mode of 
process against offenders in such state . . . be arrested.169 
The act thus empowered federal officers “to accomplish seizures and 
arrests through the usual legal processes of their resident states.”170  The term 
 
168  See supra text accompanying note 156. 
169  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (emphasis added). 
170  CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 750; see also Gerald V. Bradley, The Constitutional Theory 
of the Fourth Amendment, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 817, 854 (1989) (“[V]arious accoutrements of 
federal search and seizure, including arrest, forms of writs, their execution, and modes of 
process, were subjected to prevailing rules of the state in which the federal court was 
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“usual mode of process” was understood by contemporary lawyers as 
referring to arrest warrants,171 which explains why the statute is directed to 
judicial officers.  And Congress had within its ranks a sufficient number of 
lawyers to impute this meaning to them.172  Accordingly, as the Bill of Rights 
was being debated, Congress “assumed the applicability of state laws and 
practices governing” the power of federal officials to make arrests.173 
Then, in 1792, the Second Congress passed the Militia Act, section nine 
of which granted federal “marshals of the several districts and [their] 
deputies . . . the same powers in executing the laws of the United States, as 
sheriffs and their deputies in the several states have by law, in executing the 
laws of their respective states.”174  While the Judiciary Act of 1789 dictated 
that federal power to issue and execute arrest warrants would track state law, 
the Militia Act provided that federal power to otherwise search and seize 
would generally do so as well, except as provided by more specific federal 
legislation, such as the Collection Act of 1789 and the Excise Act of 1791.175 
Professor Thomas Davies has set forth the claim that section nine of the 
1792 Militia Act did no more than confer upon federal marshals the power 
that local sheriffs had under common law “to call out a posse comitatus of 
citizens (that is, the local militia) to suppress riots or insurrections.”176  
However, the plain meaning of section nine could not be clearer: federal 
marshals and their deputies were granted “the same powers” in enforcing 
federal lawthat local law enforcement officers have in enforcing state law.  
This certainly comprehends the power of raising a posse comitatus, but it 
 
located.”); Davies, supra note 79, at 104 (“[T]he early Congresses . . . did not enact standards 
for criminal warrants or warrantless arrests; instead, the Judiciary Act of 1789 simply directed 
federal courts and officers to use the mode of ‘process’ . . . used in the state in which they 
served.”). 
171  CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 753; see also Davies, supra note 79, at 104 (observing that 
the term “mode of ‘process’ . . . would include warrants”). 
172  See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 753 (“The Framers of the Fourth Amendment included 
so large a cross-section of legal talent that they must have equated ‘mode of process’ with the 
procedures of arrest and seizure that most contemporary lawyers understood.”). 
173  See id. (“Although th[e] statute did not mention arrest warrants, they were the linchpin 
of the ‘mode of process’ that it acknowledged.”). 
174  Militia Act of 1792, ch. 28, § 9, 1 Stat. 264, 265 (1792). 
175  As discussed more fully infra text accompanying notes 193–241, the 1789 Judiciary 
Act and the 1792 Militia Act are much more reflective of the limits placed on federal search 
and seizure authority by the Fourth Amendment than are the Collection Act of 1789 and the 
Excise Act of 1791.  The latter two Acts, and particularly the 1791 Act, were highly partisan 
pieces of legislation representing the political dominance of the Federalists in Congress in the 
very early days of the Republic.  As such, one cannot infer from these statutes any consensus 
view of the Fourth Amendment. 
176  See Davies, supra note 37, at 611; see also Davies, supra note 79, at 157 n.491; Davies, 
supra note 65, at 355–56. 
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goes well beyond that power.  The Supreme Court has consistently 
interpreted this provision as granting federal officers all the law enforcement 
powers of a local sheriff, not just the posse comitatus power.177  Scholars 
generally agree with this interpretation.178 
Professor Davies argues that since ordinary citizens had the same 
common-law power to make arrests as did constables and sheriffs, section 
nine of the Militia Act would have been superfluous had it granted federal 
marshals warrantless arrest power. After all, federal marshals and their 
deputies had no less inherent authority than private persons.179  This argument 
overlooks two salient points.  First, it is true that the common law permitted 
ordinary citizens to make warrantless arrests.  But, as of 1792, there was some 
dispute over whether and to what extent common-law precepts applied to the 
new federal government.180 Accordingly, it was unclear to what extent, if at 
all, ordinary citizens could make warrantless arrests for federal crimes.  
Given this lack of clarity, Congress would have wanted to give explicit 
direction to federal officers that their power to arrest for federal crimes 
matched state officers’ power to arrest for state crimes. 
Second, the 1792 Act goes beyond granting federal officers warrantless 
arrest authority and grants them all “the same powers in executing the laws” 
enjoyed by state officers.  This includes several powers generally denied to 
ordinary citizens.181  Perhaps most importantly, state officers generally 
enjoyed the power to execute search warrants, whereas private persons did 
not.182  It is true, as Professor Davies points out, that section 27 of the 
 
177  See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 420 (1976) (interpreting section nine of 
the Militia Act as “giving United States marshals the same power as local peace officers to 
arrest for a felony without a warrant”); accord Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 
339 (2001). 
178  See, e.g., Amar, supra note 27, at 764 (“In 1792 . . . the Second Congress explicitly 
conferred th[e] common law arrest power on federal marshals.”). 
179  See Davies, supra note 65, at 355 (“[F]ederal marshals inherently possessed the same 
common-law warrantless arrest authority possessed by any private person, which is pretty 
much all that state sheriffs possessed.”); accord Davies, supra note 59, at 157 n.491. 
180  See Mannheimer, supra note 35, at 1269–73. 
181  See Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 31, at 57–59. 
182  This appears to have differed by State.  Compare WILLIAM W. HENING, THE NEW 
VIRGINIA JUSTICE 403 (1795) (instructing that search warrants “ought to be directed to 
constable, and other public officers . . . and not to private persons . . . .”), and ELIPHALET LADD, 
TO THE HONOURABLE THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 358 (1792) (Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, and Vermont) (similar), and JAMES PARKER, THE CONDUCTOR GENERALIS: OR, 
THE OFFICE, DUTY AND AUTHORITY OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 324 (1792) (New Jersey, New 
York, and Pennsylvania) (similar),  and PETER FRENAU, THE SOUTH CAROLINA JUSTICE OF THE 
PEACE 425 (1788) (similar), with FRANCOIS X. MARTIN, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A 
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 280 (1791) (North Carolina) (“A search warrant is a justice’s order . . . 
directed to a lawful officer or any indifferent person, commanding him to search a house, or 
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Judiciary Act of 1789 had already granted federal marshals and their deputies 
the authority “to execute throughout the district, all lawful precepts directed 
to him, and issued under the authority of the United States.”183  Presumably, 
this included search warrants.  However, section nine of the 1792 Militia Act 
goes one step further and grants federal officers the equivalent power to 
execute such warrants as their state counterparts.  Moreover, relying upon 
section 27 of the 1789 Judiciary Act is a double-edged sword for Professor 
Davies, given that that section already empowered federal marshals “to 
command all necessary assistance in the execution of his duty.”184  This 
encompassed the common-law posse comitatus power,185 rendering 
superfluous the single grant of power Professor Davies suggests was given 
by section nine of the 1792 Militia Act. 
In addition, eighteenth-century justice of the peace manuals take pains 
to differentiate between the arrest powers of government officials and those 
of private persons.  So, for example, one such manual published the same 
year that the Militia Act took effect states that “all persons” must apprehend 
a felon if the felony is committed in their presence, but only “a watchman 
may arrest a night walker” and only “a constable may ex officio arrest a 
breaker of the peace in his view.”186  While private persons could halt an 
ongoing affray, they had no power to arrest the affrayers once the tumult had 
concluded.187  Nor, according to the 1792 manual, could such a person break 
doors to a private home to stop an ongoing affray.  Those powers lay 
exclusively with state officers.188 
 
houses, therein particularly named, for stolen goods.”) (emphasis added). 
183  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 27, 1 Stat. 73, 87 (1789); see Davies, supra note 37, 
at 611. 
184  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 27, 1 Stat. 73, 87. 
185  See John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A 
Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1979 (1983) (“In the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
Congress . . . gave each [federal] marshal ‘power to command all necessary assistance in the 
execution of his duty,’ including the power to call out a posse comitatus.”) (footnote omitted); 
see also Nathan Canestero, Homeland Defense: Another Nail in the Coffin for Posse 
Comitatus, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99, 110 (2003); Sean J. Kealy, Reexamining the Posse 
Comitatus Act: Toward a Right to Civil Law Enforcement, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 383, 392 
(2003); David B. Kopel, The Posse Comitatus and the Office of Sheriff: Armed Citizens 
Summoned to the Aid of Law Enforcement, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 796 (2015); 
Jason Mazzone, The Commandeerer in Chief, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 265, 315–16 (2007); 
Gautham Rao, The Federal Posse Comitatus Doctrine: Slavery, Compulsion, and Statecraft 
in Mid-Nineteenth-Century America, 26 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 16 (2008). 
186  LADD, supra note 182, at 40–41. 
187  See id. at 41; accord Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 31, at 57.  
188  See LADD, supra note 182, at 44 (“Where an affray is made in a house, in the view or 
hearing of a constable, he may break open the doors to take them.”) (emphasis added); accord 
Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 31, at 57.  One might quibble that these provisions 
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Likewise, although private persons and state officials alike could arrest 
for felonies, state officials generally had greater power to break doors to 
arrest for felonies than did private persons.  In particular, a private person 
could not break doors to arrest “barely upon suspicion of felony,” while “a 
constable in such case may justify.”189  While an ultimate finding of guilt of 
the arrestee could retroactively justify the private person’s breaking of doors 
in such an instance,190 one could hardly say that the power of the private 
person and the state official were equivalent: only the latter could, on 
suspicion of felony, break doors to arrest even an innocent person. 
At all events, even pursuant to Professor Davies’s interpretation, federal 
officers were bound by state law search-and-seizure standards, at least 
regarding warrantless arrest authority, whether by virtue of the 1792 Act or 
otherwise.191  Indeed, Professor Davies goes so far as to observe that changes 
in the underlying state law of search and seizure over time would necessarily 
also alter the authority of federal marshals to search and seize.192 
In sum, while the Fourth Amendment would dictate that a federal 
warrant must be particularized, founded upon oath, and issued only on 
probable cause,193 the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the Militia Act of 1792 
together provided that state law would determine the rest: whether the 
 
mention only “constables” while the 1792 Militia Act gives federal marshals the same powers 
as local “sheriffs.”  However, the sheriff was denominated as the “principal conservator of the 
peace” for the county.  LADD, supra note 182, at 384.  As such, he could “apprehend . . . all 
persons who break the peace, or attempt to break it.” WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 343 (1783).  Like all conservators of the peace, part of his duty was 
“in suppressing . . . affrays.”  Id. at 354.  Accordingly, sheriffs enjoyed the same power of 
halting affrays and arresting affrayers as did constables. 
189  LADD, supra note 182, at 43; see also Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 31, at 57.  
Again, while the manual uses the word “constable,” sheriffs were undoubtedly entitled to the 
same justification.  After all, the rationale behind allowing constables such a justification was 
that they could be punished if they refused to perform their duties while private persons had 
the authority to arrest but in most cases were not compelled to.  See LADD, supra note 182, at 
43.  But sheriffs, in this respect, were in the same position as constables.  See id. at 41 (“The 
warrant is ordinarily directed to the sheriff or constable, and they are indictable, and subject 
thereupon to a fine and imprisonment, if they neglect or refuse it.”) (emphasis added). 
190  LADD, supra note 182, at 42–43; see also Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 31, at 
57. 
191  See Davies, supra note 79, at 104 (“[S]tate common law continued to set the standards 
for warrantless arrests by federal officers . . . .”); Davies, supra note 59, at 210 (“Prior to the 
1930s . . . warrantless arrests by federal officers . . . were subject to the law of the state in 
which the arrest was made.”). 
192  Davies, supra note 59, at 191 n.599 (“[C]hanges in state warrantless arrest law were 
probably understood to automatically expand the warrantless arrest authority of many federal 
officers . . . .”). 
193  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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warrant could be served nocturnally, whether prior announcement was 
required, whether and to what extent the arrestee’s person and effects could 
be searched, where and under what circumstances a warrant could be 
dispensed with, and so forth.  And this state of affairs existed continuously 
from the earliest days of the Republic until the mid-1930s, when Congress 
first explicitly granted federal officers general search-and-seizure authority 
untethered to underlying state law.194 
No discussion of early federal search-and-seizure law would be 
complete without reference to the Collection Act of 1789,195 the Act of 
August 4, 1790,196 or the Excise Act of 1791.197  The Collection Act permitted 
customs searches of ships without a warrant based on “reason to suspect” that 
goods subject to duty were concealed therein.198  The 1790 Act, which 
effectively repealed the Collection Act but “imposed similar restrictions” on 
federal officers,199 permitted warrantless and suspicionless searches of ships.  
The 1791 Act permitted searches of “houses, store-houses, ware-houses, 
buildings and [other] places” without warrant if those premises were 
registered as places where distilleries were located.200  Assuming that these 
Acts shed light on the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,201 they would cut 
against the claim that the Amendment ties the search-and-seizure authority 
of the federal government to that of each respective State.  After all, the Acts 
permit warrantless searches of vessels, commercial buildings, and even 
homes, without taking account that such searches might be illegal under local 
law.  And, indeed, the Court and a number of scholars have argued that the 
Acts do tell us how the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted.  This 
 
194  See, e.g., Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 595, 48 Stat. 1008, 1008; Act of June 15, 1935, ch. 
259, § 2, 49 Stat. 377, 378; see also Davies, supra note 37, at 611–12 (“Congress never 
explicitly authorized marshals to make warrantless arrests until 1935.”); accord Davies, supra 
note 65, at 356.  One might argue that, because the 1789 and 1792 Acts require federal officers 
to follow state law, the Fourth Amendment cannot impose that requirement, for then the 
legislation would be superfluous.  But the Amendment establishes a rule of limitation, while 
the legislation is a grant of power.  The legislation granted federal executive officers search-
and-seizure power up to the limits of the Amendment.  Absent the legislation, federal officers 
would have had no special powers to search or seize beyond that which was provided to 
ordinary citizens in each State. 
195  Collection Act of 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29 (1789). 
196  Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 31, 1 Stat. 145 (1790); see also Act of Feb. 18, 1793, 
ch. 8, § 27, 1 Stat. 305, 315 (1793). 
197  Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 199 (1791). 
198  Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (1789). 
199  Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History, Searching for History, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1707, 1742 (1996). 
200  Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, §§ 25, 26, 29, 1 Stat. 199, 205–07. 
201  But see infra text accompanying notes 193–241. 
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assertion is based on the following syllogism: the same men who drafted both 
these statutes also drafted the Fourth Amendment; they would not have 
drafted statutes that they believed violated the Fourth Amendment; therefore, 
we must assume that men who drafted the Fourth Amendment believed that 
it permitted the searches allowed by the statutes.202 
However, the syllogism is faulty.203  First, while the federal statutes were 
enacted by Congress, to say the same of the Fourth Amendment is a great 
oversimplification of the process by which the Bill of Rights was adopted.  
While mere legislation has only drafters, a constitutional amendment has 
both drafters and ratifiers.  To ascribe some meaning to the latter, one must 
consult not just the Members of Congress who voted for it but also the 
members of the legislatures of the three-fourths of the States that ultimately 
ratified it. 
More importantly, the Federalists, who dominated the First Congress, 
were opposed to a Bill of Rights.204  The Bill was adopted only to placate 
moderate Anti-Federalists, who demanded it as the price for ratification.205  
While Congress was given the task of determining the precise wording of the 
amendments, the ideas that those words represent were dictated to Congress 
by the Anti-Federalists.  In Professor Gerard Bradley’s seafaring analogy: 
“[T]he intentions of the whale (the anti-federalists) are more important than 
 
202  As early as Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886), the Court employed this 
syllogism: “As [the Collection Act] was passed by the same [C]ongress which proposed for 
adoption the original amendments to the Constitution, it is clear that the members of that body 
did not regard searches and seizures of this kind as ‘unreasonable’ . . . .”  Typical of the same 
logic employed by commentators is this passage from Professor Cuddihy regarding the 
Collection Act:	  
The Collection Act of 1789 was most significant because it identified the techniques of 
search and seizure that the framers of the [Fourth] [A]mendment believed reasonable 
while they were framing it.  Congressional consideration of the search warrant section 
of that act commenced only twelve days before the [A]mendment originated, and that 
section became law just three weeks before the [A]mendment assumed definitive form.  
The Collection Act explicated the Fourth Amendment for both documents expressed 
the thoughts of the same persons upon the same subject at the same time. 
CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 737–38; see also Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 31, at 59 
(“[H]istorical exceptions to a blanket requirement come from the First Congress—the same 
body that drafted the Fourth Amendment itself.”); Arcila, Jr., supra note 37, at 1289–90 
(“[N]umerous federal statutes from the Framers’ era authoriz[ing] warrantless civil 
searches . . . evidence that neither the Framers nor other political leaders from their generation 
believed that a warrant was usually required for a valid search.”). 
203  See Davies, supra note 37, at 606 (“Numerous commentators have accepted 
uncritically [the] assumption that the 1789 statute reflected the Framers’ understanding of the 
Fourth Amendment.”). 
204  See Mannheimer, supra note 35, at 1266–67. 
205  See id. at 1278–84; see infra text accompanying note 243. 
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those of the ship’s crew (the First Congress, especially Madison).  What does 
the whale demand?  What will satisfy him and make him go away?”206  In 
order to interpret the Bill of Rights, we cannot look only, or even primarily, 
to what the First Congress may have believed it was doing. 
Given the Federalist/Anti-Federalist split in the First Congress, it is far 
from clear that there was any kind of consensus over whether these statutes 
were consistent with the Fourth Amendment.  Unfortunately, the records of 
debates and votes on these items from the First Congress are largely lost to 
history.207  Accordingly, it is disingenuous for supporters of the view that 
these Acts shed light on the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to put the 
burden of proof on those who disagree.208  Because the records of the debates 
are sparse or non-existent, it is impossible to prove one way or the other how 
much controversy was caused by the search-and-seizure provisions of these 
early Acts of Congress. 
Moreover, all the available evidence suggests that these provisions were 
viewed by opponents as of dubious constitutional validity.  For example, 
suspicionless searches of ships must have been seen as of questionable 
constitutionality, given that Americans of the period increasingly viewed 
their ships as akin to their dwellings in terms of their expectations of 
privacy.209  There is a recorded instance of this sentiment as early as 1734.210  
The years of the writs-of-assistance controversy also saw a concomitant 
“ardent public hostility” toward shipboard searches.211  In the years just 
preceding the Revolution, “Americans increasingly regarded not only houses 
but ships as castles.”212  It is inconceivable that by 1790, the sentiment of a 
large chunk of the population, identifying ships as areas deserving of a 
quantum of privacy approaching that of the home, had simply vanished such 
that the 1790 Act represented a consensus view of the Fourth Amendment. 
 
206  Bradley, supra note 170, at 834–35. 
207  See Davies, supra note 37, at 711 n.470 (observing this “serious gap in the historical 
record” regarding the 1789 Collection Act); id. at 713 n.471 (“[T]here is no record of any 
debate in the Senate regarding the 1791 Excise Act, and the record of the debate in the House 
of Representatives regarding the procedural aspects of the Act is quite limited.”); see also 
CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 737 n.257 (“The documentation on the Collection Act mentions no 
debates of its sections concerning search and seizure.  [D]ebates of those sections either never 
occurred or were not recorded.”). 
208  See, e.g., Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 31, at 59 (“If any Member of Congress 
objected to or even questioned these warrantless searches and seizures on Fourth Amendment 
grounds, supporters of a warrant requirement have yet to identify him.”). 
209  See Arcila, Jr., supra note 37, at 1299–1303. 
210  See id. at 1300 (“In 1734, a South Carolinian contended that ‘my house is my castle, 
and so is my ship.’” (quoting S.C. GAZETTE, Nov. 2–9, 1734, at 2)). 
211  Id. at 1302. 
212  CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 591. 
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The 1791 Act in particular “was widely perceived as overly intrusive of 
privacy.”213  According to Francis Wharton, the Act “produced at once great 
opposition, both in and out of Congress.”214  “A majority of the southern and 
western members [of Congress], even before the bill was passed, proclaimed 
an organized agitation for its repeal . . . .”215  The few statements we have of 
House members debating the search provisions of the 1791 Act illustrate this: 
Virginia Anti-Federalist Representative Josiah Parker216 objected to the 
provisions regarding “the mode of collecting the tax” as being “hostile to the 
liberties of the people.”217  In vivid terms, he warned that the collections 
provisions would “let loose a swarm of harpies, who, under the denomination 
of revenue officers, will range through the country, prying into every man’s 
house and affairs, and like a Macedonian phalanx bear down all before 
them.”218  Representative James Jackson, an anti-administration Federalist 
from Georgia,219 also opposed the Act as “unfriendly to the liberties of the 
people.”220  Even some generally pro-administration Federalists were against 
the Act on constitutional grounds.  Representative John Steele of North 
Carolina,221 for example, complained that the proposed Act would subject 
citizens “to the most unreasonable, unusual and disgustful situation of having 
their houses searched at any hour of the day or night.”222 
After the Act became law, it “triggered apocalyptic protests”223 and was 
“assailed violently from the country at large.”224  Maryland, North Carolina, 
Pennsylvania, and Virginia “united in solemn declarations of rooted dislike, 
and of resistance” amounting to, in some cases, “nullification.”225  Delegates 
from Pennsylvania’s western counties remonstrated to Congress and the 
Pennsylvania legislature that “[i]t is insulting to the feelings of the people to 
 
213  Arcila, Jr., supra note 37, at 1308 (emphasis omitted). 
214   FRANCIS WHARTON, STATE TRIALS OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE 
ADMINISTRATIONS OF WASHINGTON AND ADAMS 102 (1849). 
215   Id. 
216  See John H. Aldrich & Ruth W. Grant, The Antifederalists, the First Congress, and the 
First Parties, 55 J. POL. 295, 323 app. 1 (1993). 
217  1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1844 (1791). 
218  Id.; see Arcila, Jr., supra note 37, at 1309. 
219  See Aldrich & Grant, supra note 216, at 322 app. 1. 
220  1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1846. 
221  See Aldrich & Grant, supra note 216, at 323 app. 1. 
222  DAILY ADVERTISER, June 22, 1790, at 1; see Arcila, Jr., supra note 37, at 1308 n.117.  
These remarks do not appear in 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1642–43. 
223  CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 743. 
224   WHARTON, supra note 214, at 102. 
225  Id. 
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have their . . . houses . . . ransacked.”226  Subsequently, one essay appearing 
in a New York newspaper, apparently reprinted from a North Carolina paper, 
objected that, pursuant to the Act, “every citizen’s house in the United States, 
is liable to undergo the insult of a search.”227  The essay continued that the 
Act “lays open the peaceable dwellings of the inhabitants of a country to the 
entrance, insults and rudeness of a set of unprincipled excisemen,” and 
“disturb[s] the peace and happiness of their families by the entering, 
searching and ransacking their houses and closets, by a set of rude and 
insulting excisemen.”228 
The opposition to the 1791 Excise Act soon turned violent.  Barely three 
months after the Act went into effect, Robert Johnson, collector of revenues 
for Pennsylvania’s western counties, was attacked by a mob of “armed men, 
who stripped him, cut off his hair, tarred and feathered him,” and stole his 
money and his horse.229  After a complaint was filed against members of the 
mob in federal court, a man attempting to serve the papers relating to the 
litigation was tarred and feathered, had his horse and watch stolen from him, 
and was blindfolded and tied up in the woods for five hours.230  Such acts of 
terrorism in opposition to the Excise Act continued in Western Pennsylvania 
for three years until, in 1794, opposition ripened into armed insurrection, put 
down only when President Washington called in the militia.231  For this, a 
number of insurgents were later tried for treason and sentenced to hang.232  
When people burn down federal buildings, and torture and kill federal agents 
because of the intrusiveness of a federal law, one can reasonably infer that 
they were upset by the law when it was passed.233  It is inconceivable that the 
provisions of the 1791 Excise Act represent anything resembling a national 
consensus on the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The point here is not 
that the Excise Act was unconstitutional because it was controversial.  It is 
rather the more modest proposition that we cannot simply assume that the 
Excise Act was constitutional simply because it was enacted by the same 
 
226  Pittsburgh, Sept. 10, INDEP. GAZETEER, Sept. 24, 1791, at 3; see Arcila, Jr., supra note 
37, at 1308–09. 
227  Extract from Observations in a North-Carolina Paper “On the Assumption and Excise 
Law,” NEW YORK DAILY GAZETTE, Feb. 2, 1793, at 3 [hereinafter Extract from Observations]; 
see Arcila, Jr., supra note 37, at 1308. 
228  Extract from Observations, supra note 227, at 3. 
229   WHARTON, supra note 214, at 105. 
230  See id. 
231  See id. at 110–17; Arcila, Jr., supra note 37, at 1309. 
232  See  WHARTON, supra note 214, at 172–83. 
233  See LIN-MANUEL MIRANDA, HAMILTON, Cabinet Battle #1 (Atlantic Records 2015) 
(“Look, when Britain taxed our tea, we got frisky.  Imagine what gon’ happen when you try 
to tax our whiskey.”). 
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Congress that proposed the Fourth Amendment. 
More broadly, it is sometimes easy to forget that America’s first 
congressmen were politicians who belonged to political parties that often 
disagreed with one another, sometimes vehemently.  More particularly, the 
sentiments of the Anti-Federalists, those who had opposed the Constitution 
and still favored States’ rights vis-à-vis the central government, were alive 
and well in the First Congress.234  Pro-administration Federalists, who desired 
to empower the federal government with robust authority, constituted a 
majority of the First Congress.235  But the opposition was strong, and Anti-
Federalists constituted a sizeable minority.236 
Moreover, much of the legislation considered in the First Congress was 
seen as carrying over the issues from the ratification debates, and particularly 
the question of federalism.237  Fundamental questions about the nature of the 
young Republic were inherent in virtually every issue debated in the First 
Congress,238 and debate revolved around a Federalist/Anti-Federalist axis.239 
Not only was there often a Federalist/Anti-Federalist dividing line on 
important legislation in the First Congress, but the 1791 Excise Act was the 
work of none other than high Federalist Alexander Hamilton,240 whom Anti-
Federalists despised.241  It blinks reality to think that the sizeable minority of 
Anti-Federalists in Congress blithely accepted as constitutional the intrusive 
search provisions of an Act whose architect was the hated Secretary of the 
Treasury.  Indeed, opposition to Hamilton was one point around which Anti-
Federalists could rally; they generally voted as a united bloc against his 
 
234  See Aldrich & Grant, supra note 216, at 296 (“Th[e] ‘regime question’ remained open 
in the 1790s, although its focus shifted from the merits of the Constitution itself to which of 
the potential tendencies within the Constitution’s framework would prove dominant.”). 
235  See id. at 313 (“[P]ro-administration Federalists were a majority in the First 
Congress . . . .”). 
236  See id. (observing that opposition to the majority in the First Congress “was typically 
quite large, and anti-federalists provided much of that opposition”). 
237  See id. at 301 (contending that issues addressed in the First Congress “kept alive, and 
were understood as, issues raised in the ratification debates [including] the distribution of 
power . . . between the general and state governments”). 
238  See id. at 302 (“Almost every issue before the House was debated partially in terms of 
its effect on the character of the republic.”). 
239  See id. at 310 (“All of the major issues facing the First Congress had been anticipated 
before and during the ratification campaign, and they provoked arguments in the House along 
Federalist-antifederalist lines.”). 
240  See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 736 & n.254. 
241  See Jonathan Turley, Reflections on Murder, Misdemeanors, and Madison, 28 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 439, 442 n.21 (1999) (“[T]he Jeffersonians . . . hated Hamilton as the 
personification of the Federalist cause.”). 
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proposals.242  Together with anti-administration Federalists, they were almost 
able to defeat those proposals.243 
In the First Congress, the Bill of Rights, on the one hand, and ordinary 
legislation, on the other, were simply on two different political trajectories.  
The former, though necessarily blessed by the Federalist majority, was an 
Anti-Federalist project.244  The latter generally subordinated the concerns of 
the minority Anti-Federalists as part of the Federalist project of building a 
powerful central government.  This gives us a good reason to resist the facile 
notion that the expansive federal search authority created by the First 
Congress was necessarily consistent with the limitations on federal search 
authority embodied by the Fourth Amendment. 
Thus, it blinks reality to suggest any type of consensus in the First 
Congress, much less the Nation as a whole, that the Collection Act, the Act 
of August 4, 1790, and, in particular, the Excise Act, were consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment.245  It is not only that “early Americans did not always 
practice what they preached”;246 it is also that they were preaching from two 
different pulpits. 
But one can hardly say the same of the local-control provisions of the 
1789 Judiciary Act and the 1792 Militia Act.  By declining to establish 
federal search-and-seizure rules, and instead calibrating federal rules to those 
of each respective State, Congress avoided the kind of controversy 
engendered by the Collection and Excise Acts.  Unlike the latter, the local-
control provisions of the Judiciary and Militia Acts would have naturally 
enjoyed the support of the minority Anti-Federalists, and obviously enjoyed 
sufficient support from the majority Federalists to become law. 
Of course, this legislation is evidence only of what members of the early 
Congresses believed the Fourth Amendment permitted, not what they thought 
it required.  One might argue that compliance with section 33 of the Judiciary 
Act of 1789 or section 9 of the Militia Act of 1792 might put a federal officer 
afoul of the Fourth Amendment if a State’s search-and-seizure rules fell 
 
242  See Aldrich & Grant, supra note 216, at 299 (“[A]ntifederalist representatives . . . 
tended to vote together in opposition to Hamilton’s proposals . . . .”). 
243  See id. at 300 (observing that Anti-Federalists “formed a significant proportion of the 
opposition forces that Hamilton’s supporters were barely able to defeat”). 
244  See infra Section III.A. 
245  See Maclin, supra note 54, at 951 (citing “conflict among the Framers as to the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment” as a reason not to take the Collection Act as evidence of the 
Amendment’s original meaning).  A final clue that the Excise Act in particular must have been 
relatively divisive is the date of its enactment: March 3, 1791, the final day of the final session 
of the First Congress. 
246  Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse Than the Disease, 
68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 11 (1994). 
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below a constitutional minimum set by the Fourth Amendment.  Again, the 
legislative history is sparse, and we must rely to a large extent on informed 
speculation.  But notice that the statutes themselves contain no proviso to 
address that situation.  Instead, the way they are written suggests that state 
rules of search and seizure are the constitutional floor.  At a minimum, these 
statutes demonstrate that Americans of this time period were quite 
comfortable with the idea that federal power be constrained by state law, even 
if only as a matter of statute. 
III.   THE SUPERIORITY OF THE LOCAL-CONTROL MODEL 
A common thread runs through these three distinct episodes in early 
American history: local control over search-and-seizure policy.  These 
attempts to reserve local control of search-and-seizure policy during these 
three periods dovetail almost perfectly with the Anti-Federalist impetus 
behind the Fourth Amendment.  It was these opponents of the Constitution 
who ultimately compromised, demanding a Bill of Rights with robust 
protections for state norms as the price for their acquiescence to union.  They 
demanded that certain spheres of human activity be carved out of the 
centralization agenda of the Federalists and be retained for local control.  One 
of those areas, because of the grave potential for abuse, was search-and-
seizure law and policy.  In turn, what the Anti-Federalists had to say about 
searches and seizures refutes both the Reasonableness Model and the Warrant 
Model. 
A. THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
It is true that, by its terms, the Fourth Amendment does not expressly 
demand calibration of federal search-and-seizure policy to that of the States.  
Instead, it prescribes the requirements for issuance of warrants and otherwise 
demand that searches and seizures be “reasonable” (or, to be precise, not 
“unreasonable”).247  But that very term “reasonable” “cries out for a 
benchmark against which federal searches and seizures are to be 
compared.”248  Where to find that benchmark?  For the Anti-Federalists who 
demanded adoption of the Fourth Amendment, the answer was simple: in the 
search-and-seizure practices of the individual States. 
The Anti-Federalists opposed the Constitution because they feared that 
its concentration of power in the central government would lead to both the 
annihilation of the state governments and the destruction of individual 
 
247  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
248  Mannheimer, supra note 35, at 1284. 
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liberty.249  Local government and individual rights were intertwined in their 
mind: the States were positioned as the guarantors of freedom as against any 
central government, be it the British Empire, the Confederation Congress, or 
the proposed federal government.250  Every State had a Constitution, a Bill of 
Rights, or at least a strong common-law tradition of protecting individual 
liberty.251  A new central government that could act directly upon the 
citizenry without having to go through the States would be able to bypass 
these state-level protections of liberty.252  A Bill of Rights was required to 
assuage these fears.253 
Without the promise of a Bill of Rights, our nation might never have 
been formed.  At the outset of the ratification process, Anti-Federalists held 
majorities in such key States as Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia.254  
The Bill of Rights was the enticement needed to win over moderate Anti-
Federalists, who saw the flaws of the Articles of the Confederation but 
desired to maintain some of its decentralizing attributes.255  The strategy 
worked.  In the battleground State of New York, for example, moderate Anti-
Federalist Melancton Smith and eleven of his followers were sufficiently 
appeased by the promise of a Bill of Rights to sway them in favor of the 
Constitution.256  The margin of victory was three votes.257  Simply put, 
without the votes of these moderate Anti-Federalists, the United States might 
not exist today, at least as we know it.  The Bill of Rights thus should be 
understood as it was contemplated by those who demanded its inclusion in 
the Constitution in exchange for their votes in favor of ratification: as carving 
out certain spheres for control by the several States.258 
One of these spheres was search-and-seizure.  Over and over, the Anti-
Federalists expressed anxiety at leaving search-and-seizure policy in the 
hands of a new, powerful central government.  First, they demanded a 
prohibition on general warrants, as a consensus had developed by 1791 that 
 
249  See Mannheimer, supra note 35, at 1263–64; Michael J.Z. Mannheimer, Cruel and 
Unusual Federal Punishments, 98 IOWA L. REV. 69, 101–03 (2012). 
250  See Mannheimer, supra note 35, at 1264–66; Mannheimer, supra note 249, at 101–02. 
251  See Mannheimer, supra note 35, at 1264.  
252  See id.  at 1265; Mannheimer, supra note 249, at 103. 
253  See Mannheimer, supra note 35, at 1268; Mannheimer, supra note 249, at 104. 
254  See Mannheimer, supra note 35, at 1278; Mannheimer, supra note 249, at 108. 
255  See Mannheimer, supra note 249, at 100. 
256  See Mannheimer, supra note 35, at 1280–81. 
257  See Richard B. Morris, John Jay and the Adoption of the Federal Constitution in New 
York: A New Reading of Persons and Events, 63 N.Y. HIST. 133, 162 (1982); David E. Narrett, 
A Zeal for Liberty: The Antifederalist Case Against the Constitution in New York, 69 N.Y. 
HIST. 285, 289 (1988). 
258  See Mannheimer, supra note 35, at 1284; Mannheimer, supra note 249, at 109. 
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such warrants were unlawful.259  However, their concern went beyond merely 
the idea that warrants be specific, and encompassed anxiety over federal 
executive officers’ search-and seizure authority more generally.  Consider, 
for example, Massachusetts Anti-Federalist John DeWitt’s warnings 
concerning potential federal authority to be given to federal tax collectors.  
He wrote: 
They [Congress] are to determine, and you are to make no laws inconsistent with such 
determination, whether such Collectors shall carry with them any paper, purporting 
their commission, or not—whether it shall be a general warrant, or a special one—
whether written or printed—whether any of your goods, or your persons are to be 
exempt from distress, and in what manner either you or your property is to be treated 
when taken in consequence of such warrants.  They will have the liberty of entering 
your houses by night as well as by day for such purposes.260 
That DeWitt was primarily concerned with local control of search-and-
seizure policy, and only as an ancillary matter with any particular aspect of 
that policy, is evident from the way in which he began his discussion: 
Congress is “to determine” all of the rules attending searches and seizures, 
“and you are to make no laws inconsistent with such determination.”  Read 
this language in the light shone by Massachusetts’s unsuccessful attempt to 
legislatively overturn the result in Paxton’s Case,261 and its later reservation 
of local search-and-seizure law as applied to national officials in its 
legislation ratifying the 1783 confederal impost.262  The problem, according 
to DeWitt, was not simply that federal search-and-seizure policy might 
contain features disliked by Bay Staters regarding warrantless searches, the 
extent of seizures, the treatment of persons and property subject to seizure, 
and nocturnal searches.  The real problem was that Massachusetts would be 
unable—as it had done in 1783 and attempted to do in 1762—to pass 
legislation to do something about it. 
Likewise, Patrick Henry in the Virginia ratifying convention despaired 
of the loss of local control over searches and seizures.  He observed that even 
local sheriffs, although “under the watchful eye of [the Virginia] legislature,” 
had “committed the most horrid and barbarous ravages on [the] people.”263  
This had been met, with limited success, by state legislation “to suppress their 
 
259  See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 739–43. 
260  John DeWitt, To the Free Citizens of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts IV, 
reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 29, 33 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) 
(emphasis added). 
261  See supra text accompanying notes 99–101. 
262  See supra text accompanying note 143. 
263  3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 58 (Jonathan Elliott ed., 2d ed. 1901) [hereinafter ELLIOTT’S 
DEBATES]. 
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iniquitous speculations and cruel extortions.”264  He then raised the specter 
of federal officers searching with impunity through every inch of the people’s 
dwellings, of “harpies . . . aided by excisemen, who may search, at any time, 
your houses, and most secret recesses.”265  Henry contrasted the attempts by 
the state legislature to keep vigilant watch over wayward local sheriffs with 
the unlikely prospect that such attempts by a national legislature would be 
successful: “[I]f sheriffs, thus immediately under the eye of our state 
legislature . . . have dared to commit these outrages, what would they not 
have done if their masters had been at Philadelphia or New York?”266  Thus, 
Henry argued that the national legislature and federal judges were far less 
likely to constrain federal officers through legislation and common-law 
rulemaking than were the state legislature and state judges.  The premise of 
this argument is a common refrain among the Anti-Federalists: that local 
control enhances the accountability of government actors while centralized 
power weakens political accountability.267  Consequently, according to 
Henry, nothing would “tie [the] hands” of federal tax collectors and 
excisemen vis-à-vis intrusive searches and seizures.268 
Henry’s prescription for this problem was that such searches and 
seizures should be subject to state, not federal, regulation.  He made this clear 
at another point during the Virginia ratifying convention, when he raised the 
specter of a federal “exciseman . . . demand[ing] leave to enter [one’s] cellar, 
or house, by virtue of his office.”269  He explained that he was unwilling to 
abide such a potentiality “without any reservation of rights or control.”270  
The best reading of Henry’s prescription of a “reservation of rights” and 
“control,” pursuant to what ultimately became the Fourth Amendment, given 
his other comments, is that he meant local control—legislative and judicial—
of federal officials.  Such control, of course, had already taken place in 
Virginia, in the form of local refusal to issue writs of assistance, perfectly 
legal under English law, but which conflicted with local sensibilities.271 
The statements made by the Anti-Federalists regarding their fears over 
federal search-and-seizure policy, viewed in the light shed by the multiple 
 
264  Id. 
265  Id. 
266  Id. 
267  See Michael J.Z. Mannheimer, Self-Government, the Federal Death Penalty, and the 
Unusual Case of Michael Jacques, 36 VT. L. REV. 131, 148–55 (2011) (exploring Anti-
Federalist view of accountability deficits flowing from large-scale Republic). 
268  ELLIOTT’S DEBATES, supra note 263, at 57; see Mannheimer, supra note 35, at 1275. 
269  Speech by Patrick Henry (June 14, 1788), in 3 ELLIOTT’S DEBATES, supra note 263, at 
412. 
270  Id. 
271  See supra text accompanying note 112. 
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instances of the assertion of local control against central authority in the thirty 
years straddling the framing period, thus support a local-control model of 
Fourth Amendment protection.  Such a model posits that the central concern 
of the framers and ratifiers of the Fourth Amendment was placing decisions 
regarding search-and-seizure policy in the hands of the States rather than the 
new central government. 
B. THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS AND THE REASONABLENESS AND 
WARRANT MODELS 
The statements of Anti-Federalists such as John DeWitt and Patrick 
Henry, and the more general sentiments of the Anti-Federalists, also largely 
refute both the Reasonableness Model and the Warrant Model.  Taking into 
account the complete historical picture, a local-control model is superior to a 
historical model that posits warrants as the touchstone of Fourth Amendment 
protection, on the one hand, and one that holds the federal government only 
to some nebulous standard of reasonableness, on the other. 
One need go no further than the statements of DeWitt and Henry 
discussed above to refute Professor Amar’s claim that the framers and 
ratifiers of the Fourth Amendment were exclusively concerned with general 
warrants and were unperturbed by warrantless searches.  Notice several 
things about the enlightening passage from DeWitt.  First, he expressed 
anxiety that federal tax collectors might have a “paper purporting their 
commission,” i.e., a warrant, “or not.”272  That is, he expressed a concern that 
tax collectors might act without warrant at all, in addition to expressing the 
concern that such a warrant might be “general” rather than “special.”273  
Moreover, he expressed concern about “whether any of [one’s] goods, or . . . 
persons are to be exempt from distress.”274  Again, this goes beyond a concern 
regarding the specificity of warrants and suggests that there might be 
limitations on how “goods” and “persons” can be searched or seized even 
with a warrant.  DeWitt probably had in mind the precept, discernible from 
Entick v. Carrington, that seizure of “mere evidence” of a crime, even 
pursuant to warrant, was unlawful.275  Furthermore, DeWitt worried about 
the manner in which persons and property are “to be treated when taken in 
consequence of such warrants.”276  Again, the concern is not just with general 
 
272  See supra text accompanying note 258. 
273  See id. 
274  See id. 
275  95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).  See also Amar, supra note 27, at 782 (asserting that a 
warrant issued on probable cause “justified searches only for items akin to contraband or stolen 
goods, not ‘mere evidence’”). 
276  See supra text accompanying note 258.  
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warrants but also with the way in which they were to be executed.277  Finally, 
he expressed a concern about nocturnal searches, which again goes to the 
execution of search warrants as opposed to their generality or specificity. 
Henry, too, was concerned not only with a federal official’s using 
general warrants, but also with his not obtaining a warrant at all and executing 
a search “by virtue of his office.”278  Indeed, Henry chose his words carefully.  
By describing a potential warrantless search by a federal excise collector as 
being “by virtue of his office,” he deliberately evoked the ex officio (that is, 
warrantless) searches by British customs officials in the 1740s and 1750s that 
incensed the people of Massachusetts and were a prelude to the writs of 
assistance controversy.279  To those who clamored for a federal constitutional 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, “an ex officio search 
and a writ of assistance search were two different sides of the same coin” 
because “[b]oth allowed broad, discretionary . . . power without any 
requirement of specific cause or judicial oversight.”280  Like DeWitt, Henry 
also stoked fears of nocturnal searches, by conjuring up images of federal 
“harpies . . . assisted by excisemen[,] ‘who may search, at any time.’”281 
On the other hand, the confidence of Warrant Model adherents in 
judicial control of executive officers is in sharp tension with the deep 
suspicion that the Anti-Federalists felt toward the prospect of a federal 
judiciary.  It is true, of course, that colonial judges largely (though not 
uniformly) sided with the colonists during the writs of assistance 
controversy.282  However, these were the forerunners of state judges; federal 
judges were another matter.  Anti-Federalists continually complained that 
“[t]he Constitution creates a powerful judicial branch that threatens the 
integrity of state courts.” 283  Indeed, the major conflict during the first twenty 
 
277  DeWitt may have had in mind warrantless searches incident to arrest.  The common 
law authority to conduct such a search was not nearly as well settled at the time of the framing 
as modern Supreme Court decisions have made it out to be.  Compare Mannheimer, supra 
note 35, at 1252–53 (observing that search-incident-to-arrest authority was discussed in only 
two out of eleven justices of the peace manuals printed in North America between 1761 and 
1795), with Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (asserting that search-incident-
to-arrest authority has “always [been] recognized under English and American law”). 
278  See supra text accompanying note 267; CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 683 (explaining that 
Henry was concerned about federal excisemen searching “without warrant”).  
279  See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 363; Maclin, supra note 20, at 219. 
280  See Maclin, supra note 20, at 222–23. 
281  See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 683. 
282  See Maclin, supra note 20, at 227 (asserting that “many [colonial] judges . . . strongly 
opposed practices that granted custom officers the discretion to invade the privacy and 
personal security of individuals”). 
283  See SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING 
TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788–1828 , at 30–31 (1999). 
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years of the Republic over the existence of federal common law284 stemmed 
at least in part over Anti-Federalist, and then Jeffersonian Republican, 
distrust of federal judges.  As Patrick Henry warned in his speech referenced 
above, federal judges would be “sworn to support this [federal] Constitution, 
in opposition to that of any state, and . . . may also be inclined to favor their 
own officers.”285  Placing limits on federal executive officers that were to be 
enforced by federal judges would have been, to the Anti-Federalists, putting 
the foxes in charge of the henhouse.  The notion that this was the central goal 
of the Fourth Amendment is a creation of the twentieth century, not the 
eighteenth. 
The Fourth Amendment is not primarily about separation of powers.  It 
is mostly about federalism.  Recall that Patrick Henry expressed support for 
the idea that local sheriffs be kept “under the eye of [the] state legislature and 
judiciary.”286  But the Anti-Federalists did not trust the federal legislature and 
judiciary to restrain federal officers.  Rather, the idea was to restrain federal 
executives via the state legislature and judiciary, the former by formulating 
search-and-seizure policy, and the latter by both controlling the issuance of 
warrants and providing remedies for trespass (and, in doing so, building upon 
the common law of search and seizure).  This, after all, was exactly how the 
writs of assistance controversy played out in most of the colonies: local 
legislatures and judiciaries constraining the executive power of the Crown.  
It was also at the heart of the state legislation ratifying the federal impost in 
the 1780s, which forced state search-and-seizure policy, as formulated by 
local legislatures and judges upon confederal enforcement officers.  And it 
was the strategy of section 33 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and section 9 of 
the Militia Act of 1792, which required that federal agents generally abide by 
state law when they search and seize. 
To the Anti-Federalists, the Bill of Rights was largely about self-
government and local control of the policies that affected people most 
directly.  As Professor Gerard Bradley cogently observed: “‘[T]he right of 
the people,’ specified by the [F]ourth [A]mendment, was not apprehended by 
its ratifiers to refer to an individual’s ‘right’ to be governed by laws other 
than those favored by the community’s desire and political authority to enact 
them.”287  Search-and-seizure law is fundamentally about striking an 
appropriate balance between liberty and security.  And the Anti-Federalists 
saw this as fundamentally a matter for each “community’s desire,” not 
 
284  See Mannheimer, supra note 249, at 113–20.  
285  3 ELLIOTT’S DEBATES, supra note 263, at 58. 
286  Id. 
287  Bradley, supra note 170, at 862.  
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national policy.288 
By 1791, a consensus had developed throughout the United States that 
general warrants were unlawful.289  Thus, the Fourth Amendment specifically 
bans them.  But no similar consensus had developed on many of the other 
issues of search-and-seizure policy that had arisen, such as when warrants are 
needed.  On issues such as these, the history surrounding the adoption of the 
Fourth Amendment points most strongly not toward a general warrant 
requirement nor toward a general reasonableness standard, but to a regime of 
local control of federal officials.  It was a regime that most closely accorded 
with the demands of the Anti-Federalists, whose support ultimately was 
necessary to form the Union.  And it was a regime that Americans in 1791 
would have been used to. 
C. AN ASIDE ABOUT INCORPORATION OF A LOCAL-CONTROL MODEL 
OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
One nettlesome problem is how to translate this local-control model into 
a useable framework governing searches and seizures by state, rather than 
federal, officials.  If the Fourth Amendment is primarily about federalism and 
thus preserves local control of search-and-seizure authority, one might 
conclude that no effective constitutional constraint on state searches and 
seizures can exist.  While a complete response to this potential objection is 
beyond the scope of this Article, some rough contours can be briefly sketched 
out. 
State searches and seizures are, of course, governed by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.290  It is only through the legal fiction 
of incorporation that we speak of the Fourth Amendment as applying to the 
States.  And, whatever else it might require, the core, irreducible command 
that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of . . . liberty[] or property, 
without due process of law” is that state executive officials must follow state 
law in searching and seizing.  Due process, on this view, is largely about 
separation of powers, preventing the executive from depriving persons of 
their interests in ways that are authorized by neither the legislative nor the 
judicial branch.291 
 
288  See Amar, supra note 27, at 818 (observing that local juries are optimally situated “to 
decide, in any given situation, whom it fears more, the cops or the robbers,” and that “[t]his 
judgment . . . will vary from place to place and over time”).  
289  See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 637–58. 
290  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
291  See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 6, at 1782 (“The first, central, and largely 
uncontroversial meaning of ‘due process of law,’ . . . was that the executive may not seize the 
MANNHEIMER_FINAL PROOF 4/5/18  8:33 PM 
302 MANNHEIMER [Vol. 108 
The core meaning of the Due Process Clause is that, before depriving 
someone of life, liberty, or property, state officials must follow the law.  This 
is very similar to the view of the Fourth Amendment espoused by Warrant 
Model enthusiasts that the central value of that Amendment is curbing 
executive discretion.  The difference is that those who espouse the Warrant 
Model envision only a single way of curbing executive discretion, through 
the judicial superintendence of the warrant process.  But due process arguably 
is more fluid and forgiving, allowing executives to act pursuant either to 
judicial directives via warrant or to specific legislation permitting them to 
undertake particular conduct under particular circumstances.292  And, of 
course, police must also abide by search-and-seizure provisions of state 
constitutions, which are often stricter than the Fourth Amendment itself.293  
If due process means at its core that the police must follow state law in 
conducting searches and seizures,294 then it means a lot.  Indeed, if state 
authorities violate the U.S. Constitution whenever they violate these 
constraints—a position the U.S. Supreme Court unfortunately has 
rejected295—the result is a sharp enhancement, not a diminishment, of 
individual liberty. 
One might object that an edict that police obey state law is, at the end of 
the day, no protection at all.  After all, a State that overvalues security and 
undervalues liberty might decide to implement a totalitarian search-and-
seizure regime.  But political process theory suggests that this fear is 
overblown.  Here, due process and equal protection constraints work in 
tandem: not only must police obey the law, but that law must apply equally 
 
property or restrain the liberty of a person . . . without legal authority arising either from 
established common law or from statute.”). 
292  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 31 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (opining that if a 
State were to specifically authorize police to forcibly stop and disarm a person reasonably 
suspected of having a concealed weapon, a police officer’s actions pursuant to that authority 
would be constitutional). 
293  See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State 
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 548–49 (1986). 
294  The Court at one time suggested just such an approach to due process.  See Barrington 
v. Missouri, 205 U.S. 483, 486–87 (1907) (“[I]f . . . the admission of th[e] testimony did not 
violate . . . the [C]onstitution and laws of the state of Missouri, the record affords no basis for 
holding that he was not awarded due process of law.”).  Though the Barrington Court held 
only that adherence to state law was sufficient in providing due process of law, this suggests 
that adherence to state law is also necessary in providing due process of law. Id.  
295  See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (holding that arrest by state police 
officer based on probable cause but which violated state statute did not violate Fourth 
Amendment).  Moore is perhaps justified as a decision about the applicability of the 
exclusionary rule and not the scope of the Fourth Amendment itself.  See id. at 180 (Ginsburg, 
J., concurring in the judgment). 
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to all, including state legislators and their constituents.  If the majority and 
their political representatives do not wish to be subject to searches and 
seizures without warrant and without cause, they cannot visit that treatment 
upon outgroups.296  Again, the presence of search-and-seizure protections at 
the state level strongly suggests that, when the law applies equally to all, at 
least on a formal basis, the States are fully capable of striking an acceptable 
balance between liberty and order. 
The hedge “at least on a formal basis” in the preceding sentence points 
up the most troublesome potentiality of such a view of how the Fourth 
Amendment should apply to the States.  For a State might implement a set of 
search and seizure constraints weighed in favor of security at the expense of 
liberty, formally imposing the associated burdens on everyone, but in fact 
subjecting minorities and the politically unpopular to searches and seizures 
at a much higher rate than members of the dominant group.  Of course, such 
a world is not difficult to imagine⎯in many ways, it is the one we inhabit.  
To take one obvious example, the standard of reasonable suspicion required 
for police to forcibly stop and detain citizens is a low one.297  Yet few white 
people and people of means have to worry much about the inconvenience and 
humiliation of being stopped and detained by the police, something that poor 
people of color contend with on a daily basis.298 
If the worst that can be said of this approach is that it replicates the status 
quo, then so be it.  But even under this model, a more robust form of 
protection against arbitrary searches and seizures by the police can be 
imagined.  For example, courts might calibrate their scrutiny of searches and 
seizures to the amount of discretion given the police, such that where people 
of particular racial groups are disproportionately subjected to searches and 
seizures, weightier race-neutral justifications are required when these 
outcomes are the result of broad grants of law enforcement discretion.  By 
contrast, courts might be more deferential when the same outcomes result 
 
296  See William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth 
Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1855 (2016) (justifying a model that determines 
whether a Fourth Amendment search has occurred by looking to positive law, in part, on the 
ground that it is capable of tying “the neglected interests of those who face government 
investigation to the much broader interests of society at large”); see also Railway Express 
Agency, Inc. v. New York 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[T]here is no 
more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to 
require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be 
imposed generally.”). 
297  See, e.g., United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985) (requiring only 
“reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person . . . was 
involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony” to forcibly detain someone). 
298  See generally Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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from tightly constrained discretion.  And if broad discretion is inevitable, 
minimal national standards might be required as a last resort.  But this is far 
different from making uniform national standards the default rule.  Beyond 
these initial thoughts, however, this Article leaves for another day the 
problem of deriving constraints on the States from a federalism-driven Fourth 
Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
Reasonableness Model adherents and Warrant Model advocates are 
each part right and part wrong.  The Fourth Amendment does subject federal 
officials to a standard of reasonableness, not a regime of warrants.  But it is 
not a freestanding reasonableness standard to be constructed freehand by 
federal judges.  It is a standard of reasonableness tied to and established by 
local law: statutes enacted by local legislatures, common-law doctrines 
determined by local judges, and normative judgments made in particular 
cases by local juries.  By the same token, the Fourth Amendment does 
sometimes require that federal officials use warrants.  But they are required 
to use warrants only when, and only to the extent that, their state counterparts 
also fall under this obligation. 
